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Abstract
Recently, a Canadian administrative tribunal recognized homosexuals as a particular social
group. In April 1992, the Convention Refugee Determination Division (the “CRDD”) of the Cana-
dian Immigration and Refugee Board (the “Canadian IRB”) granted refugee status to an Argentine
man who was persecuted in Argentina because of his homosexuality.The Canadian IRB held in
Re: Inaudi that homosexuals constitute a particular social group for the purpose of satisfying the
definition of “refugee.” Re: Inaudi is similar to the two U.S. administrative decisions in that Re:
Inaudi does not have precedential value. This Comment argues that U.S. courts and administrative
agencies should rely on Re: Inaudi to hold that homosexuals constitute a particular social group.
Part I sets forth the origin of the social group category in U.S. and Canadian immigration law. Part
I also examines how the phrase “membership in a particular social group” has been interpreted
and applied in Canada and the United States. Furthermore, Part I discusses the U.S. government’s
treatment of homosexuals. Part II sets forth the facts and holding of the Canadian IRB’s decision
in Re: Inaudi. Part III argues that Re: Inaudi provides a thorough analysis of why homosexuals
constitute a particular social group, integrating into its decision the various factors that the U.S.
has applied in determining what constitutes a particular social group in general. Because Re: In-
audi provides a thorough, detailed and sound analysis of what constitutes a particular social group
in general, and why homosexuals, in particular, form a particular social group, U.S. courts and
administrative agencies should rely on Re: Inaudi to extend their definition of a particular social
group to include homosexuals. This Comment concludes that, in the future, the U.S. BIA and the
U.S. federal courts should recognize homosexuals as a particular social group for the purposes of
satisfying the definition of “refugee.”
THE SOCIAL GROUP THAT DARE NOT SPEAK ITS NAME:
SHOULD HOMOSEXUALS CONSTITUTE A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP FOR
PURPOSES OF OBTAINING
REFUGEE STATUS? COMMENT. ON RE: INAUDI
INTRODUCTION
Aliens qualify for political asylum in the United States and
Canada if they are persecuted or, have a well-founded fear of per-
secution in their countries of origin because of their race, reli-
gion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particu-
lar social group.' These individuals satisfy the definition of "ref-
ugee," a statutory term adopted by the United States and Canada
as well as other countries. 2 Many aliens have sought refugee sta-
tus by claiming persecution on account of their "membership in
a particular social group" ("particular social group").3
1. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1988); Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.),
c. 28, s. 2(1); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 268, 268 n.1 (hereinafter Protocol].
2. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1988) with Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985
(4th Supp.), c.28, s. 2(1). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1988), a "refugee" is
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion ....
Id. According to Canadian law, a "Convention refugee" means any person who
by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of the person's nationality and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or not
having a country of nationality, is outside the country of his former habitual
residence and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to return to
that country.
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 2(1); see also 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S.
150, 151 [hereinafter 1951 Convention] (listing other countries, including Norway,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Australia, and the United Kingdom, that adopted similar defini-
tions of "refugee").
3. See, e.g., Saleh v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 962 F.2d 234, 240 (2d Cir. 1992)
(reviewing claim that indigent Yemeni Moslems and Yemeni Moslems living abroad
form "particular social groups"); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (consider-
ing claim that women previously raped and attacked by guerrillas form "particular so-
cial group"); Arriaga-Barrientos v. United States INS, 937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991)
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Homosexuals have sought relief from persecution by claim-
ing to be members of a particular social group. Courts in Eu-
rope and Australia have addressed such claims.4 Furthermore,
the Netherlands, Germany, and Australia have recognized that
homosexuals constitute a particular social group. In the United
States, two administrative decisions, an unpublished opinion by
(considering claim that former servicemen in Guatamalan military constitute "particu-
lar social group"); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (determining
whether young, urban, working-class El Salvadoran males of military age not in military
form "particular social group"); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985)
(considering claim that family unit is "particular social group"); In re Chang, Interim
Dec. No. 3107 at 12 (BIA 1989) (deciding whether Chinese citizens who desire large
families are "particular social group"); In re Vigil, 19 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574-78 (BIA
1988) (determining whether Salvadoran draft-age males not in army form "particular
social group"); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232-34 (BIA 1985) (considering
whether El Salvadoran. taxi driver's cooperative is "particular social group"); Re:
Shahabaldin, (Mar. 2, 1987) No. V85-6161 at 6 (I.A.B.) (reviewing claim that certain
group of Iranian women constitute "particular social group"); Re: Zubieta, (Oct. 31,
1979) No. 79-1034 at 2-6 (I.A.B.) (dealing with whether trade unionists are members of
"particular social group").
4. See Case Abstracts, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 242, 246 (1989) (summarizing case
before Holland's Afdeling Rechtspraak van de Raad van State, Judicial Division of the
Council of State). The Netherlands ruled that homosexuals are members of a particu-
lar social group for purposes of satisfying the definition of refugee. Id. 'In this case, the
Judicial Division of the Council of State denied a homosexual Polish national refugee
status, but stated that persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group can include persecution on account of sexual disposition. Id. at 246-47. The
German Federal Administrative Court also noted that homosexuals may constitute a
particular social group. See Cases and Comments, 1 INr'LJ. REFUGEE L. 101, 110 (1989)
(summarizing 1988 case in Federal Republic of Germany). Although the German court
did not reach the issue concerning whether homosexuals are "a particular social
group," it stated that "homosexuality can be considered as an attribute that could be
ground for asylum, if it is an irreversible personal characteristic." Id. Furthermore, the
United Kingdom has addressed similar claims by homosexuals. See Cases and Comments,
2 Irr'LJ. REFUGEE L. 647, 657-59 (1990) (summarizing Regina v. Sec. of State for Home
Dep't. (1989) (United Kingdom)). In Regina, the Secretary of State denied refugee
status to a Cypriot who claimed he was persecuted for being an active homosexual. The
Secretary of State stated that "homosexuals per se could not constitute a particular so-
cial group within the meaning of the 1951 Convention." Id. at 657-58. The appellate
court, however, held that it was unnecessary to decide whether homosexuals per se
constituted a social group because Cyprus only discriminated against homosexual con-
duct, not status. Id.
5. See supra note 4 (describing German and Dutch cases recognizing homosexuals
as particular social group); see also Australia Takes in Gay Refugees, BAY AREA REP., Apr.
16, 1992 (stating that gay couple from China was granted refugee status in Australia
because they were persecuted in China on account of their sexual orientation); Gay
Couple Escapes Mainland Repression, SoUrH CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 25, 1992 (report-
ing on migration of homosexuals from China to United States and Australia for asy-
lum); David Tuller, Gay Foreigners Ty New Way to Stay, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 1992, at Al,
A8 (stating officials in Germany, Netherlands, and Australia have granted asylum to gay
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the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), and an Immigration
Judge decision, have addressed the issue and recognized homo-
sexuals as a particular social group.6 In the United States, how-
ever, Immigration Judge decisions and unpublished BIA opin-
ions do not have precedential value.
Recently, a Canadian administrative tribunal recognized
homosexuals as a particular social group.' In April 1992, the
Convention Refugee Determination Division (the "CRDD") of
the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Canadian
IRB") granted refugee status to an Argentine man who was per-
secuted in Argentina because of his homosexuality.9 The Cana-
dian IRB held in Re: Inaudi that homosexuals constitute a partic-
ular social group for the purpose of satisfying the definition of
"refugee."' ° Re: Inaudi is similar to the two U.S. administrative
decisions in that Re: Inaudi does not have precedential value."
This Comment argues that U.S. courts and administrative
agencies should rely on Re: Inaudi to hold that homosexuals con-
stitute a particular social group. 12 Part I sets forth the origin of
men); Doris Sue Wong, More Gays Seeking US Asylum, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1992, at 13
(stating that homosexuals have been granted asylum in Finland and Sweden).
6. See In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (holding that homosexu-
als constitute particular social group) (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal); In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (Immigration Judge, July 26, 1993) (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal); see also James Brooke, In Live-and-Let-Live Land,
Gay People Are Slain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1993, at A4 (discussing In re Tenorio).
7. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1993) (stating that only selected decisions designated by
BIA serve as precedents); Matter of Ruis, 18 I. & N. Dec. 320, 321 n.1 (BIA 1982) (stat-
ing that Immigration Judge's reliance on unpublished BIA decisions were not control-
ling because unpublished BIA decisions did not have precedential value); In re Lok, 18
I. & N. Dec. 101, 107 (BIA 1981) (distinguishing between precedent setting BIA deci-
sions and unreported BIA decisions); accord In re Medrano, Interim Dec. No. 3138 (BIA
1991); Leah F. Chanin, SPECIALIZED LEGAL RESEARcH § 8.6.3 (1992) (stating that BIA
decisions published as precedent bind INS nationwide in cases involving similar issues).
Theoretically even unpublished opinions are applicable to Board's deliberations but
these unpublished opinions are useful only to those who are affected by them or who
know of them. Id.; see also C.F.R. §§ 3.12-3.40 (describing Immigration Judge proceed-
ings and not indicating that Immigration Judge decisions have precedential value).
8. See Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 5-6 (I.R.B.) (recognizing homo-
sexuals as particular social group).
9. Re: Inaudi, I.R.B. No. T91-04459 (Apr. 9, 1992).
10. Id. at 5-6.
11. Because the CRDD is the only body that determines refugee claims, its deci-
sions are not binding on anybody else. The decision by the CRDD panel that decided
Re: Inaudi, however, is persuasive authority for other panels of the CRDD.
12. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Argentine Homosexual Gets Refugee Status in Canada,
N.Y. TiM, Jan. 14, 1992, at A1O (stating that Rebecca Cook, law professor at University
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the social group category in U.S. and Canadian immigration law.
Part I also examines how the phrase "membership in a particular
social group" has been interpreted and applied in Canada and
the United States. Furthermore, Part I discusses the U.S. govern-
ment's treatment of homosexuals. Part II sets forth the facts and
holding of the Canadian IRB's decision in Re: Inaudi. Part III
argues that Re: Inaudi provides a thorough analysis of why homo-
sexuals constitute a particular social group, integrating into its
decision the various factors that the U.S. has applied in deter-
mining what constitutes a particular social group in general. Be-
cause Re: Inaudi provides a thorough, detailed and sound analy-
sis of what constitutes a particular social group in general, and
why homosexuals, in particular, form a particular social group,
U.S courts and administrative agencies should rely on Re: Inaudi
to extend their definition of a particular social group to include
homosexuals. This Comment concludes that, in the future, the
U.S. BIA and the U.S. federal courts should recognize homosex-
uals as a particular social group for the purposes of satisfying the
definition of "refugee."
I. THE ORIGIN, INTERPRETATION, AND APPLICATION OF
THE PHRASE "MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR
SOCIAL GROUP" IN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES
The United States and Canada have adopted essentially the
same definition of "refugee."" As a result, Canadian and U.S.
administrative agencies and courts confront the same task of in-
terpreting the scope of the phrase "membership in a particular
social group."' 4 Both countries, consequently, have established
interpretive standards.' 5
of Toronto, considers Re: Inaudi important precedent and expects Re: Inaudi to effect
refugee cases in United States); David Tuller & Dan Levy, Gay Rights on a Worldwide
Front, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24, 1992, at Al, A6 (stating that decision in Re: Inaudi could
pressure U.S. immigration officials to decide same way).
13. See supra note 2 (setting forth definitions of refugee pursuant to U.S. and Ca-
nadian law).
14. See supra note 3 (providing examples of decisions by U.S. and Canadian admin-
istrative agencies and courts interpreting "membership in a particular social group").
15. Id.
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A. Emergence of the Definition of "refugee"
The United States Refugee Act of 1980 (the "Refugee Act of
1980")16 and the Canadian Immigration Act of 198517 adopted
the definition of the term "refugee" contained in two United Na-
tions treaties." U.S. Congressional debates19 and case law20 and
Canadian law21 indicate both countries' intent to adopt the defi-
nition of "refugee" established in the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (the "1951 Convention") 22 and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Proto-
col").23 The Protocol adopted the definition of "refugee" set
forth in the 1951 Convention, but did not include the 1951 Con-
vention's time and geographical restrictions. 4
16. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988)) (amending INA).
17. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 2(1).
18. See 1951 Convention, supra note 2; Protocol, supra note 1, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at
6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 270. The United States rafified the Protocol on October 4, 1968.
114 CONG.REc. 29,607 (1968).
19. See, e.g, 126 CONe. REc. 3,756 (96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1980). The legislature
stated that "[t]he new definition makes our law conform to the United Nations Conven-
tion and Protocol .... " Id. at 3,757; accord 125 CONG. REC. 35,813-26 (1979).
20. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). The Court stated, "[i]f
one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and
indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring
United States refugee law into conformance with the [Protocol]." Id.; see David T. Par-
ish, Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social
Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 923, 924-26 (1992) (argu-
ing that Congress intended Refugee Act of 1980 to conform to international law).
21. See Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 2(1).
22. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. The
1951 Convention is the primary legal instrument establishing the international system
of refugee protection. Id. The 1951 Convention applied the term refugee to any per-
son who
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to, well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id.
23. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. The
Protocol is the United Nations treaty modifying the definition of refugee provided by
the 1951 Convention. Id.
24. See Protocol, supra note 1, art.1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (incor-
porating, with two exceptions, Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention, supra note 2,
art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152). Article 1 of the Protocol states
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To qualify as a refugee pursuant to the 1951 Convention
and the Protocol, aliens must demonstrate three things.25 First,
they must seek relief from outside their country of origin. 26 Sec-
ond, aliens seeking asylum in the United States must either be
persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution in their
country of origin. Aliens seeking asylum in Canada must have
a well-founded fear of persecution.28 Third, they must be perse-
cuted or fear persecution on account of their race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 9 Individuals qualify for asylum in the United States or
Canada if they satisfy this definition of "refugee."3"
The social group category was created by the 1951 Conven-
tion."1 While neither the 1951 Convention nor the Protocol de-
fined the phrase "membership in a particular social group,"
3 2
For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as
regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within
the definition of article 1 of the 1951 Convention as if the words "As a result of
events occurring before 1 January 1951 and.. . "and the words ... as a result
of such events", in article 1 (A) (2) were omitted.
Id.
25. See Protocol supra note 1, art.l, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268; 1951
Convention supra note 2, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(1988); Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th
Supp.), c. 28, s. 2(1).
27. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1988).
28. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 2(1).
29. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(1988); Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th
Supp.), c. 28, s. 2(1).
30. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980); Immigration Act,
R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 2(1). In the United States, relief pursuant to the
definition of refugee is sought through asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992), withholding of deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and
refugee status, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). These separate avenues of
relief mandate different procedural requirements, subject applicants to varying stan-
dards of proof of persecution, and offer different benefits. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 207-208
(1993); see BAsic LAw MANUAL: ASYLUM, (1991) (providing thorough explanation of
procedural requirements, different standards of proof and different benefits offered
under each avenue of relief).
To qualify for asylum, withholding of deportation or refugee status, an alien must
first satisfy the definition of "refugee." See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988) (stating that alien
must satisfy definition of refugee to qualify for asylum status); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 440-41 (1987) (stating that applicant for withholding of deportation must
satisfy definition of refugee); 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) (1988) (stating that refugee status
will be denied if definition of refugee is not met).
31. See 1951 Convention supra note 2, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
32. See 1951 Convention, supra note 2, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (provid-
ing no definition of particular social group); see also Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d
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the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (the "UNHCR"), an agency authorized by the Protocol to
coordinate compliance with its provisions, 3 defined the phrase
in the Handbook of Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status (the "Handbook")." The Handbook, which provides gui-
dance for interpreting all of the Protocol's provisions, states that
a particular social group normally is comprised of persons of
similar background, habits, or social status.3 5  Although the
Handbook's definition has been criticized as too vague and unin-
formative,3 6 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the Handbook as
a source of significant guidance in construing the Protocol's pro-
visions.3 7 Some U.S. and Canadian courts and administrative
agencies have cited the Handbook in their analyses of the phrase
"membership in a particular social group."38
B. Canadian Interpretation of a Particular Social Group
1. Application Process
In Canada, persecuted aliens are eligible for protection if
1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that legislative history of definition of refugee is
generally uninformative); Parish, supra note 20, at 925-26 (stating that neither Congress
nor Protocol nor 1951 Convention clarified definition of term "refugee").
33. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6226, 606 U.N.T.S. at 270 (stating
that state members of Protocol shall cooperate with United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees in its duty to supervise application of Protocol).
34. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK]. The HANDBOOK states that a "'particular social group' normally comprises
persons of similar background, habits or social status. A claim to fear of persecution
under this heading may frequently overlap with a claim to fear of persecution on other
grounds, i.e. race, religion, or nationality." Id. 77.
35. Id. 77.
36. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812
(1992) (failing to abide by or even refer to HANDBOOK in asylum decision); Sanchez-
Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that HANDBOOK provides
little assistance in arriving at workable definition of "particular social group"); In re
Tenorio, A72 093 558 at 13 (Immigration Judge 1993) (stating that HANDBOOK provides
little guidance for construing meaning of "particular social group").
37. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987) (finding that "HAND-
BOOK provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress
sought to conform"); see Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984)
(acknowledging HANDBOOK as source of guidance in applying Refugee Act).
38. See, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (relying
on HANDBOOK in decision); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)
(employing HANDBOOK in analysis); Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 4-5
(I.R.B.) (citing HANDBOOK); Re: Requena-Cruz, (Apr. 8, 1986) No. T83-10559 (I.A.B.)
(citing HANDBOOK).
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they satisfy the definition of "refugee" set forth in the 1951 Con-
vention as modified by the Protocol.39 An alien who satisfies this
statutory definition is considered a "Convention refugee" and
may obtain permanent residence in Canada.4 ° A new applica-
tion process was implemented in February, 1993."'
At the time Re: Inaudi was decided, however, an alien seek-
ing refugee status first notified an Immigration Officer of an in-
terest in applying for refugee status.4 2 Subsequently, an Adjudi-
cator and a member of the CRDD determined whether the
claimant was eligible to make a refugee claim and if so, whether
the claimant had a credible basis to a refugee claim.43 If found
to be eligible and to have a credible basis, the claimant was sent
to the CRDD for a "full, hearing. '44 In the full hearing, the
CRDD determined whether or not the claimant met the defini-
tion of "refugee."45 If denied the claim, an applicant could ap-
peal to the Federal Court.46
Since February, 1993, Bill C-864 7 has replaced the process
discussed above. Now the Immigration Officer determines
whether the claimant is eligible to make a refugee claim. If eligi-
ble, then the claimant is referred to the CRDD for a full hear-
ing.48 Again, if the CRDD denies an application for refugee sta-
tus, the claimant can appeal a denial to the Federal Court.
49
2. Canada's Definition of a Particular Social Group
Canadian courts have recently set forth specific criteria to
consider in determining what constitutes a particular social
group.50 Although Canada's administrative agencies have also
addressed claims by aliens alleging membership in a particular
39. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 2(1). See supra notes 25-30
and accompanying text (describing three requirements in definition of "refugee").
40. Immigration Act R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-2 s. 46.14(1).
41. See Immigration Act, S.C. 1992, c. 49.
42. Section 44 of the Immigration Act R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-2.
43. Immigration Act R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-2 . 46 as rep. by S.C. 1992 c. 49, s. 34.
44. Immigration Act R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-2, s. 46.02(2).
45. Section 69.1 of the Immigration Act R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-2 s. 69.1.
46. Immigration Act R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-2 s. 82.1.
47. Immigration Act, S.C. 1992, c. 49.
48. Immigration Act, S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 37.
49. Immigration Act, S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 82.1.
50. See Ting Ting Cheung v. M.E.I., (Apr. 1, 1993), No. A-785-91 (F.C.A.), Maho-
ney, Stone, & Lindeh.JJ.A.; Ward v. A.G. Canada (June 30, 1993) No. 21937 (S.C.C.),
La Forest, L'heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Stevenson, lacobucci JJ.A.
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social group,-" Canadian administrative authorities have not es-
tablished specific guidelines for determining what constitutes a
particular social group.2
a. Canadian Courts
In Ting Ting Cheung v. The Minister of Employment and Immi-
gration,53 the Federal Court of Canada54 held that women who
have more than one child and are therefore threatened with
sterilization under China's one child policy, constitute a particu-
lar social group.5  The court focused on three distinct factors in
determining a particular social group. 6 First, the court stated
that these women comprise a group sharing similar social status
and holding similar interests not held by their government.57
Second, these women have certain basic characteristics in com-
mon.58 Finally, these women are united or identified by a pur-
pose that is so fundamental to their human dignity that they
should not be required to change. 9 According to the court, in-
terference with a woman's reproductive liberty is a basic right
"ranking high in our scale of values."6°
51. See, e.g., Re: Requena-Cruz, (Apr. 8, 1986) No. T83-10559 at 5 (I.A.B.); Re:
Shahabaldin, (Mar. 2, 1987) No. V85-6161 (I.A.B.); Re: Incirciyan, (Aug. 10, 1987) No.
M87-1541X and M87-1248 (I.B.); Re: Zubieta, (Oct. 31, 1979) No. 79-1034 and 79-
1034A (I.A.B.); Re: Roberto Cruz, (June 26, 1986) No. V83-6807 (IA.B.).
52. Carolyn P. Blum, Refugee Status based on Membership in a Particular Social Group:
A North American Perspective, in ASYLUM LAW AND PRACrMCE IN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 81, 95-99 (Geoffrey Coil & Jacqueline Bhabha, ed.
1992).
53. Ting Ting Cheung v. M.E.I. (Apr. 1, 1993) No. A-785-91 (F.C.A.), Mahoney,
Stone, & Linden, .] A.
54. The structure of the Canadian courts reflects a division between federal and
provincial courts. J.R. MALLORY, THE STRucruRE OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT 289-98
(1971). The federal courts include different tiers. Id. at 292-95. The Supreme Court
of Canada is a "general Court of Appeal for Canada" which exercises general appellate
jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases and also renders advisory opinions on certain
issues. Id. at 292. The Federal Court of Canada consists of two divisions, a Trial Divi-
sion and an Appeal Division. Id. at 293-94. There are also several federal special courts
or boards which are designated by statute as courts of record, and territorial courts. Id.
at 295. The provincial courts are divided into three classes depending on the method
of appointment and tenure of theirjudges. Id. at 295-98. There are provincial superior
courts, county courts, and provincial inferior courts. Id.
55. Ting Ting Cheung, (Apr. 1, 1993) No. A-785-91 at 7-8 (F.C.A.).
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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More recently, in Ward v. The Attorney General,6 the
Supreme Court of Canada rendered a decision further analyzing
the definition of a particular social group. 2 In Ward, the Court
decided that a certain terrorist organization did not constitute a
particular social group.6" The Court considered possible defini-
tions of a particular social group. 64 The first of these definitions
would recognize any alliance of individuals with a common ob-
jective.65 The second category narrowed the definition by cer-
tain "limiting mechanism[s]."66 And the third category excluded
from the first broad category immoral individuals, including ter-
rorists and criminals." The Court dismissed the first category as
too broad.6" In addition, the Court stated that the third possible
definition of a particular social group would render redundant
the explicit exclusionary provisions in the Immigration Act.69
The Court, however, adopted the second definition of a particu-
lar social group.7"
The Court's definition of a particular social group recog-
nized certain restrictions inherent in the definition of a refu-
gee.7 First, a claimant must be persecuted to be considered a
member of a particular social group.7 2 Second, the enumeration
of other grounds for refugee Status excludes certain groups from
falling within the particular social group category.7" Third, the
court pointed to the underlying themes that are the basis for
refugee protection, defense of human rights and anti-discrimina-
tion, and concluded that Canada should not overstep its role in
the international sphere by recognizing as refugees any group
that is targeted for persecution and by offering a haven for all
61. Ward, Patrick Francis v. A.G. Canada (S.C.C., no. 21937) La Forest,
L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Stevenson, Iacobucci (Stevenson took no part in judg-
ment) June 30, 1993.
62. Id. at 61-62.
63. Id. at 38-62.
64. Id. at 38-60.
65. Id. at 41-47.
66. Id. at 41, 45-55.
67. Id. at 55-60.
68. Id. at 44.
69. Id. at 56.
70. Id. at 44-55.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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suffering individuals."4
Finally, drawing a distinction between that which one is and
that which one does,75 the. Court relied. on Cheung to articulate
the scope of a particular social group: (i) groups defined by an
innate or unchangeable characteristic; (ii) groups whose mem-
bers voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their
human dignity that they should not be forced to not associate;
and (iii) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalter-
able due to its historical permanence.76 Providing examples of
groups within each category, the Court stated that individuals
persecuted on the basis of sexual orientation would fall within
the first group and therefore constitute a particular social
group.
7 7
In a case unrelated to a refugee claim, the Federal Court
Trial Division also addressed the group status of homosexuals. 8
In Veysey v. Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada,79 the
applicant alleged that his rights under the Charter of Rights and
74. Id. at 54.
75. Id. The court stated
[s]urely there are some groups, the affiliation in which is not so important to
the individual that it would be more appropriate to have the person dissociate
him- or herself from it before Canada's responsibility should be engaged. Per-
haps the most simplified way to draw the distinction is by opposing that which
one is against that which one does at a particular time.
Id. As an example, the court cited the facts of Matter of Acosta, a U.S. BIA decision in
which the claimant argued that he was a member of a particular social group made up
of members of a taxi driver cooperative. Id. The court in Ward stated
[a] ssuming no issues of political opinion or the right to earn some basic living
are involved, the claimant was targeted for what he was doing and not for what
he was in an.immutable or fundamental way.
Id.
76. Id. at 54-55.
77. Id. at 55. The court stated that
[t] he first category would embrace individuals fearing persecution on such ba-
ses as gender, linguistic background and sexual orientation, while the second
would encompass, for example, human rights activists. The third branch is
included more because of historical intentions, although it is also relevant to
the anti-discrimination influences, in that one's past is an immutable part of
the person.
Id.
78. See Veysey v. Comm'r of the Correctional Serv. of Canada (1990), 1 F.C. 321
(FCTD) (holding that homosexuality is analogous to other characteristics that form
social groups, including religion, nationality, and ethnicity); JAMES C. HATHAWAy, THE
LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 163-64 (1991) (stating that basis for treating sexual orientation
as characteristic capable of defining social group was established in Veysey).
79. Veysey (1990), 1 F.C. 321 (FCTD).
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Freedoms (the "Charter"),"0 a Canadian statute, were violated.8 1
Section 15 of the Charter prohibits discrimination against
groups defined by race, national or ethnic origin, color, age, reli-
gion, sex, and mental or physical disability. 2 The applicant suc-
cessfully argued that a prison policy failing to extend conjugal
visitation rights to homosexual partners discriminated against
homosexuals and, therefore, violated Section 15 of the Char-
ter.83
The court held that homosexuality is analogous to the enu-
merated characteristics set forth in the Charter and, therefore, is
protected by the Charter.84 The court noted that race, national
or ethnic origin, color, and age are immutable characteristics.85
Further, the court stated that religion can only be changed with
difficulty, and sex and mental or physical disability can be
changed with even greater difficulty.86 The court determined
that sexual orientation is at least as immutable as one of the
other prohibited grounds of discrimination within the Charter.8 7
Additionally, the court stated that, like other groups that suffer
discrimination, homosexuals are stigmatized and victimized. 8
80. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11.
81. See Veysey (1990), 1 F.C. 321, 323-25 (FCTD) (citing Charter). Mr. Veysey was
an inmate at a prison and applied to participate in the Private Family visiting Program
at the Institution with Mr. Leslie Beu, his homosexual partner. Id. at 323-24. The insti-
tution refused Mr. Veysey's application, claiming that the visiting policy did not extend
to common-law partners of the same sex. Id. at 324. Mr. Veysey argued that he was
denied a benefit on the basis of his sexual orientation and that such a denial was a
violation of his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Id. at 324-
25.
82. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
83. Veysey (1990), 1 F.C. 321, 323-25 (FCTD).
84. Id. at 329. The court stated that
[m]ost of the grounds enumerated in section 15 of the Charter as prohibited
grounds of discrimination connote the attribute of immutability, such as race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, age. One's religion may be changed but
with some difficulty; sex and mental or physical disability, with even greater
difficulty. Presumably, sexual orientation would fit within one of these levels
of immutability.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Concluding that the applicant's rights had been violated, the court noted
that
[a] nother characteristic common to the enumerated grounds [of the Charter]
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b. Canadian Administrative Agencies
Canadian administrative agencies, the IRB and Immigration
Appeals Board ("LAB"), have recognized several particular social
groups.89 In the past, homosexuals have made claims to the IRB
and the IAB of persecution on account of membership in a par-
ticular social group.9 0 These claims were dismissed as lacking
credibility.91 The IAB, which preceded the IRB, however, has
stated that the social group category must be interpreted
broadly.92
In Re: Fernandez-Ortigoza,9 s the IAB ruled that the applicant's
family ties, his affiliation with a political student group, and his
status as a "returnee," one who had left the country for a consid-
erable period of time and then returned, constituted member-
ship in a particular social group.94 In addition, the IRB and IAB
is that the individuals or groups involved have been victimized and stigmatized
throughout history because of prejudice, mostly based on fear or ignorance, as
most prejudices are. This characteristic would also clearly apply to sexual ori-
entation, or more precisely to those who have deviated from accepted sexual
norms, at least in the eyes of the majority.
Id.
89. See, e.g., Re: Shahabaldin, (Mar. 2, 1987) No. V85-6161 (I.A.B.) (determining
that Iranian woman, who testified that many of her family members had suffered perse-
cution because of family's reputation as anti-Khomeni, was member of "particular social
group" made up of her immediate family members); Re: Incirciyan, (Aug. 10, 1987)
No. M87-1541X and M87-1248 (I.A.B.) (stating that applicants are members of "particu-
lar social group" made up of single women living in Moslem country without protection
of male relative); Re: Zubieta, (Oct. 31, 1979) No. 79-1034 and 79-1034(a) (I.A.B.)
(holding that worker's general trade union formed "particular social group"); Re: Ro-
berto Cruz, (June 26, 1986) No. V83-6807 (IA:B.) (holding that Salvadoran men
targeted by guerrillas and military constitute "particular social group").
90. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Argentine Homosexual Gets Refugee Status in Canada,
N.Y. TIME, Jan. 14, 1992, at Al0 (quoting lawyer for alien-applicant in Re: Inaudi, (Apr.
9, 1992) No. T91-04459 (I.R.B.)).
91. Id.
92. Re: Requena-Cruz, (Apr. 8, 1986) No: T83-10559 at 5 (I.A.B.) (stating that so-
cial group must be given broad and liberal interpretation in order to protect groups or
individuals who do not necessarily have political, religious or racial ties at root of their
persecution).
93. Re: Fernandez-Ortigoza, (Jan. 26, 1987) No. V83-6704 (I.A.B.).
94. Id. at 2-8. In.Re: Fernandez-Ortigoza, police-in Guatemala assaulted Mr. Ortigoza
for his membership in a student organization that participated in anti-government ac-
tivities. Id. at 2. In addition, Mr. Ortigoza's cousin had been active in an anti-govern-
ment union in Guatemala and was currently publicizing in Canada, Guatemala's
human rights violations. Id. at 4-6. As a result of threats by police, Mr. Ortigoza left the
country and came to Canada. Id. at'6. An expert testified that Mr. Ortigoza's lengthy
absence from Guatemala and his having a relative active in anti-government activities
would raise authorities' suspicions of Mr. Ortigoza should he return to Guatemala. Id.
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have sanctioned particular social groups including families,95 wo-
men,96 trade unions,9" and Salvadoran men victimized by the
military and guerrillas.98 Although several groups have been rec-
ognized, the administrative tribunals have shown concern over
the size of these groups.99 For example, in Re: Dos Santos
Vieira'°° the LAB refused to recognize the agricultural working
class of Portugal as a particular social group. 10 1
at 4-5. The court did not distinguish between the three groups, but it has been argued
that, in light of Canadian precedent, each of the groups with which the applicant was
affiliated constitutes a social group within the definition of "refugee." Blum, supra note
52, at 95.
95. Re: Shahabaldin, (Mar. 2, 1987) No. V85-6161 at 6 (I.A.B.) (determining that
Iranian woman, who testified that many of her family members had suffered persecu-
tion because of family's reputation as anti-Khomeni, was member of particular social
group made up of her immediate family members); Re: Requena-Cruz, (Apr. 8, 1986)
No. T83-10559 at 3 (I.A.B.) (holding that family constitutes social group within defini-
tion of Convention refugee); see Re: Barra Velasquez, (Apr. 29, 1981) No. V80-6300 at 3
(I.A.B.) (holding that harassment suffered as result of membership in close-knit ex-
tended family constituted persecution).
96. See, e.g., Re: Incirciyan, (Aug. 10, 1987) No. M87-1541X and M87-1248 at 1
(I.A.B.) (stating that applicants are members of particular social group made up of
single women living in Moslem country without protection of male relative); Blum,
supra note 52, at 93-99 (giving additional examples of particular social groups recog-
nized by Canadian courts and immigration agencies); see also Clyde H. Farnsworth, Anti-
Woman Bias May Bring Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at A8. The Canadian Govern-
ment granted a Saudi woman, who held unconventional views on the status of women
in Saudi Arabia, permission to remain in Canada to avoid possibility of grave danger if
she returned to Saudi Arabia. Id. The I.R.B. has issued guidelines for gender-related
persecution that include women who can prove that their countries fail to provide pro-
tection from sexual abuse, domestic violence, genital mutilation, and other torture. Id.
Canadian officials also stated that they could address the issue by classifying women
protesting sex-based persecution as a particular social group. Id.
97. See, e.g., Re: Zubieta, (Oct. 31, 1979) No. 79-1034 and 79-1034A at 6 (I.A.B.)
(holding that applicant incontestably belonged of particular social group).
98. See, e.g., Re: Roberto Cruz, (June 26, 1986) No. V83-6807 at 4 (I.A.B.) (holding
that applicant's evidence of death of brother, disappearance of father, pressure to join
guerrillas or army and general climate of uncertainty and danger in which youth of El
Salvador live, was sufficient to support his claim that he belonged to particular social
group).
99. Re: Dos Santos Vieira, (June 11, 1976) No. 87-9098X at 2, 5 (I.A.B.) (finding
large size of purported social group significant in rejecting claim of "agricultural work-
ing class of Portugal"). See Blum, supra note 52, at 98 (finding that LAB seems moti-
vated in its interpretation by questions of size).
100. Re: Dos Santos Vieira (June 11, 1976) No. 87-9098X (I.A.B.).
101. Id. at 2. In Re: Dos Santos Vieira, the applicant lived in a small village in Portu-
gal where, he claimed, economic conditions were very poor. Id. Significant to the
lAB's rejection of applicant's claim as the fact that applicant's alleged social group con-
sisted of "all of rural Portuguese society." Id. at 4.
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C. U.S. Interpretation of a Particular Social Group
In the United States, the Refugee Act of 1980 defines "refu-
gee."1 °2 Congress delegated its power to enforce the Refugee
Act of 1980 to the Attorney General.10 3 The Attorney General
enforces this law via the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS")' °4 and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 0 5
1. Application Process
Pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980, an alien must satisfy
the definition of "refugee" to be eligible either for asylum, with-
holding of deportation, or refugee status." 6 Typically, an Immi-
gration Judge'1 7 of the INS evaluates whether an applicant has
established that she is a refugee.' 08 Decisions by Immigration
Judges are not binding on any other Immigration Judge or on
any higher authority.10 9
Decisions by Immigration Judges can be appealed to the
BIA, an administrative review board established by the Attorney
General."1 Published BIA decisions serve as precedent."' BIA
decisions, however, are subject to review by the U.S. Courts of
Appeals." 2 The circuit courts must defer to the BIA's interpreta-
tion of the definition of "refugee"'1 3 as long as the BIA's inter-
102. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. at 102. The Refu-
gee Act was enacted to enforce the Protocol's terms. See Parish, supra note 20, at 924
n.8 (explaining necessity of legislation to guarantee U.S. compliance with Protocol).
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1988).
104. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1993).
105. 8 C.F.R. § 3.0 (1993).
106. See supra note 30 (indicating sources for further inquiry into differences in
various avenues of relief, and demonstrating that alien must satisfy definition of "refu-
gee" to receive protection under any avenue of relief).
107. 8 C.F.R. § 3.10 (1993).
108. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4, 208.13-208.14 (1993) (stating that applications for asy-
lum are to be filed with Immigration Judge during exclusionary or deportation pro-
ceedings or after completion of exclusionary or deportation proceedings).
109. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.12-3.40. This section, which describes Immigration Judge
proceedings, does not indicate that Immigration Judge decisions have precedential
value.
110. 8 C.F.R § 3.1(a)(1) (1993).
111. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1993).
112. See, e.g., Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing
BIA order denying asylum); Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1990) (review-
ing BIA order denying asylum).
113. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (4) (stating that administrative holding must be
upheld if reasonable); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (stating that courts
must respect BIA's interpretation of phrase "well-founded fear" within definition of ref-
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pretation is reasonable." 4
2. The United States' Definition of a Particular Social Group
The Refugee Act of 1980 defined "refugee." 1 5 A concrete
definition of the phrase "particular social group," however, was
not provided by the 1951 Convention, the Protocol, or Con-
gress. 1 6 Therefore, the terms of the Refugee Act were left for
the Attorney General and the judiciary to interpret. 1 7 As a re-
sult, the BIA and the U.S. federal courts have articulated defini-
tions of the scope of the social group category." 8
a. U.S. Administrative Decisions
The only BIA case to establish a standard for determining
whether an applicant for asylum is a member of a particular so-
cial group is In re Acosta. 1 9 In In re Acosta, the BIA held that a
group qualifies as a particular social group if its members possess
a common immutable characteristic. 20 According to the BIA,
an immutable characteristic includes a trait impossible to
ugee); In re Lok, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 107 (BIA 1981) (stating that pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
1105a(a) (4), appellate courts' scope of review is limited); see also Parish, supra note 20,
at 937-39 (providing thorough explanation of degree of deference to BIA required by
courts).
114. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. 812 (1992). The Court stated that "the
BIA's determination that [the claimant) was not eligible for asylum must be upheld if
'supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered
as a whole'." Id. at 815 (citing 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4)).
115. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). See
supra note 2 (setting forth statutory definition of "refugee").
116. See supra note 32 (discussing that "particular social group" was not specifically
defined).
117. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text (setting out application process
and BIA and federal courts' authority to address application for refugee status).
118. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting out
four-prong test for satisfying requirements of "particular social group"); Matter of
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211; 232 (BIA 1985) (articulating standard to be followed by
BIA); Parish, supra note 20, at 923 (presenting model for particular social group); Ar-
thur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group As a Basis for Refugee
Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 39 (1983) (proposing liberal interpretation of
"particular social group").
119. See 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232-35 (BIA 1985); Parish, supra note 20, at 936 (stat-
ing that only Acosta provides significant guidance in interpreting "social group" and
providing thorough analysis of case).
120. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211; see Maureen Graves, From Definition to Exploration: Social
Groups and Political Asylum Eligibility, 26 SAN DiEGo L. lEv. 740, 770-74 (1989) (provid-
ing thorough analysis of Acosta); accord Parish, supra note 20, at 936-37; Blum, supra
note 52, at 83-84.
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change or a trait that, as a matter of conscience, should not be
required to be changed. 121
In In re Acosta, respondent was a co-founder of COTAXI, a
cooperative organization of taxi drivers in El Salvador. 122
COTAXI was allegedly the target of anti-government guerril-
las.'12  When COTAXI refused to comply with the guerrillas' de-
mands, guerrillas allegedly seized and burned a number of
COTAXI taxis and assaulted and killed several COTAXI driv-
ers.1 24 Respondent allegedly was assaulted and received three
threatening notes. 25 Because he feared for his life, respondent
left El Salvador and illegally entered the United States.' 26 Re-
spondent requested asylum and based his claim of persecution
on his membership in a particular social group made up of
COTAXI members. 27
The BIA denied respondent's request for asylum.' 2 8 The
BIA held that neither the respondent's membership in COTAXI
nor his refusal to participate in guerrilla terrorism constituted
immutable characteristics.1 2 9 The BIA noted that respondent
easily could have changed jobs to avoid persecution. 30 The BIA
stated that its standard for determining if a group is a particular
social group (i.e. requiring a group to share an immutable char-
121. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 at 233
122. Id. at 216.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 216-17.
125. Id. at 217. The Immigration Judge found respondent's testimony insufficient
to prove that he received death threats and was assaulted. Id. at 218.
126. Id. at 217.
127. Id. at 232.
128. Id. at 232-34. The BIA concluded that
because the respondent's membership in the group of taxi drivers was some-
thing he had the power to change, so that he was able by his own actions to
avoid the persecution of the guerrillas, he has not shown that the conduct he
feared was 'persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group'.
Id.
129. Id. at 234. The BIA stated that
[t] he characteristics defining the group of which the respondent was a mem-
ber and subjecting that group to punishment were being a taxi driver in San
Salvador and refusing to participate in guerrilla-sponsored work stoppages.
Neither of these characteristics is immutable because the members of the
group could avoid the threats of the guerrillas either by changing jobs or by
cooperating in work stoppages.
130. Id.
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acteristic) should be applied on a case-by-case basis.' In this
case, respondent's membership in COTAXI was neither an in-
nate trait, such as sex, race, or family, nor a shared past experi-
ence, such as former military leadership or land ownership, that
would be sufficiently immutable to form a particular social
group. 32
The doctrine of e'usdem generis was a critical factor in the
BIA's analysis of the definition of a particular social group. 33
Ejusdem generis literally means "of the same kind."1 34 Pursuant to
this doctrine, where a statute lists categories that explicitly limit
the statute's scope and each category is described by words with
a specific meaning, general words that follow are to be con-
strued as narrowly as those categories specifically listed.'15 For
example, the definition of "refugee" enumerates factors on
which persecution can be based including race, nationality, reli-
gion, and political opinion. 3 These limiting categories are fol-
lowed by the more general phrase, "membership in a particular
social group."" 7 According to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the
phrase "membership in a particular social group" should be con-
strued as narrowly as the preceding categories. 38
The BIA stated that the other four statutory premises for
persecution provided in the Protocol (race, religion, nationality,
and political opinion) are immutable characteristics because
they cannot be changed or are so fundamental to one's identity
that they should not be required to be changed. 3 9 Conse-
quently, the social group category must require the same ele-
131. Id. at 233.
132. Id. The BIA did not elaborate on what kinds of group characteristics would
form a "particular social group." Blum, supra note 52, at 84 (stating that BIA did not
elaborate on kinds of group characteristics implicated in "particular social group" cate-
gory); accord Graves, supra note 120, at 773.
133. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. The BIA also cited scholarly interpretations. Id. (cit-
ing A. GRAHL-MADSEN, 1 THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1966) and G.
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1983)). The BIA also cited the
definition of the social group category provided by the HANDBOOK. Id. The BIA, how-
ever, fails to expound on the significance of these sources in its analysis and formation
of a standard to be applied to the social group category. Id.
134. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
135. Id.; see 2A NoRMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 47.18, at 200 (5th ed. 1992) (setting out doctrine of ejusdem generis).
136. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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ment of immutability to be consistent with the other catego-
ries.'4 ° In this case, neither respondent's membership in
COTAXI nor his refusal to participate in guerilla terrorism was
considered immutable.'
41
b. Federal Court Decisions
Circuit courts have relied on precedent, the Handbook, and
statutory language defining "refugee," in their analysis of the
phrase "membership in a particular social group."142 Relying on
these factors, courts have defined a particular social group by its
members' voluntary association, shared immutable characteris-
tics, or the persecutor's perception of the members of the
group.143 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, is the only U.S. court that has established a test for deter-
mining what constitutes a particular social group for the pur-
poses of satisfying the definition of "refugee."
44
In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS,' 45 the Ninth Circuit established a
four-prong test for determining whether petitioners were eligi-
ble for asylum because of their membership in a particular social
group.'4 6 The first prong of the test, and the threshold question
that courts must decide, is whether the class of people identified
140. Id.
141. Id. at 234.
142. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing statu-
tory language and precedent as factors in its decision); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766
F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing HANDBOOK, supra note 34, in its decision).
143. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasizing persecutor's per-
ception); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (emphasizing voluntary association);
Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985) (emphasizing immutability).
144. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-75 (setting out four prong test to deter-
mine "particular social group"); Parish, supra note 20, at 940 (stating that Ninth Circuit
is only circuit to have developed its own test for cognizability of alleged particular social
group). Parish also provides an analysis of Sanchez-Trujillo. Id. The Ninth Circuit,
which includes California, Washington- Oregon, Montana, Idaho, Arizona, and Nevada,
hears the largest percentage of asylum and deportation cases. Lisa Stansky, Counsel Rate
Ninth Circuit Almost Paradise for Aliens, REc.,' Feb. 1, 1991, at I (quoting statistics com-
piled by Administrative Office of U.S. Courts that in 1989-90, Ninth Circuit handled 68
appeals involving immigration offenses, more than twice as many as Fifth Circuit, next
highest with 32 cases).
145. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
146. Id. The test entails four questions: (1) is the class of people cognizable as a
particular social group under the immigration statutes; (2) have the petitioners estab-
lished that they qualify as members of the group; (3) has the purported social group in
fact been targeted for persecution on account of the characteristics of the group mem-
bers; (4) are "special circumstances" present to warrant the court in regarding mere
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by the petitioners is a cognizable social group under the Refugee
Act. 147 The remainder of the test inquires into whether an appli-
cant qualifies as a member of the purported cognizable group,
whether the purported social group was actually targeted for
persecution, and whether there were special circumstances pres-
ent to regard mere membership in that social group as sufficient
for asylum. 14 Voluntary association, homogeneity, and close af-
filiation among members were most important to the court's
analysis in defining a cognizable social group. 4 9
Petitioners in Sanchez-Trujillo alleged that they were mem-
bers of a particular social group made up of young, urban, work-
ing-class males of military age who had maintained political neu-
trality and who were targeted for persecution by the government
of El Salvador. 5 ° The court held that petitioners' purported so-
cial group was too broad, even if the group faced a greater risk
of persecution than the general population.' 5 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit, applying the first prong of its test, denied petition-
ers' application for asylum because petitioners failed to prove
their membership in a cognizable social group. 52
The Ninth Circuit stated that the social group category ap-
plies to groups that are persecuted for reasons other than race,
religion, nationality, or political opinion.'53 The court, however,
was concerned with the category's lack of outer limits.' 5 4 In in-
terpreting the confines of a particular social group, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed the Handbook's definition of a "particular social
group" as vague and unhelpful and dismissed the legislative his-
tory of the definition of the term "refugee" as uninformative. 55
Instead, the court focused on the statutory language of the Refu-
membership in that social group as constituting per se eligibility for asylum or prohibi-
tion of deportation. Id. at 1574-75.
147. Id. at 1575.
148. Id. at 1574-75.
149. Id. at 1576.
150. Id. at 1573. Petitioners testified that the National Guard had killed other
young males and that one of the petitioners was attacked by government officials and
interrogated by the National Guard. Matter of Sanchez and Escobar, 19 I. & N. Dec.
276, 280-81 (BIA 1985).
151. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1576.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1575-76; see supra note 34 (providing HANDBOOK definition of "particu-
lar social group").
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gee Act and on judicial precedent in defining the phrase. 156
The Ninth Circuit examined the phrase, "membership in a
particular social group."5 7 The court stated that the words "par-
ticular" and "social" modify the word "group," and, therefore,
the statute precludes the phrase from encompassing every
loosely distinguished segment of a population. 5 Judge Beezer,
writing for the court, found that the phrase instead implies a
group of individuals voluntarily associated and marked by a com-
mon characteristic fundamental to their identity.15 9 In this man-
ner, the court restricted an otherwise limitless category. 60
In defining a particular social group, the Sanchez-Trujillo
court also relied on precedent.' 61 Prior cases held that major
segments of an embattled nation's population are not a social
group even if they face the risk of persecution. 62 Such persons
lack the cohesiveness and homogeneity inherent in the defini-
tion of a particular social group. 63 The Ninth Circuit warned
against an interpretation that would extend refugee status to
every alien displaced by general conditions of unrest in his home
country. 64
Judge Beezer stated that the immediate members of a family
form a prototypical example of a particular social group. 65 The
Ninth Circuit found that a family is a "focus of fundamental af-
156. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The court stated that
the phrase 'particular social group' implies a collection of people closely affili-
ated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest.
.Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship
among the purported members which imparts some common characteristic
that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social group.
Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1576-77.
162. Id. at 1577 (citing Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985); Chavez
v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984)).
163. Id. at 1577.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1576 (finding "the family being a focus of fundamental affiliational con-
cerns and common interests for most people"). But see Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d
916 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that concept of persecution of social group does not ex-
tend to persecution of family); De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that asylum claim based on membership in group made up of family members of
military deserters from Salvadoran army failed to satisfy first prong of Sanchez test).
19931 249
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filiational concerns" and emphasized that families are small and
their members are easily identifiable.' 66 The court then con-
trasted a "family" with a social group made up of males taller
than six feet. 6 7 The court found that this group was an "all-
encompassing group" to which the court did not believe the
term was intended to apply. 6 Petitioners' class was likened to
the group made up of males taller than six feet.'69 The court
concluded that to hold that young, urban, working class males of
military age who had maintained political neutrality satisfied the
definition of a particular social group would render the defini-
tion of "refugee" meaningless. 170 Therefore, petitioners failed to
meet the first prong of the Ninth Circuit's test because the class
of people identified by the petitioners was not cognizable as a
particular social group.
17 1
Commentators have criticized the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion.172 Although the court in Sanchez-Trujillo stressed voluntary
association as the cornerstone of its analysis, some commenta-
tors argue that immutability was an underlying factor in the
court's decision. 173 This argument relies on the fact that the
court offered a family as an example of a particular social
group 174 and that, generally, membership in a family is involun-
166. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1577. The court rejected the purported particular social group argu-
ment because its members fall within a "sweeping demographic division and naturally
manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and con-
trary political leanings." Id. The court further stated that "major segments of the popu-
lation of an embattled nation, even though undoubtedly at risk from general political
violence will rarely constitute a distinct 'social group'." Id. (citing Lopez v. INS, 775
F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); see
De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 1990) (drawing analogy to alleged social
group in Sanchez, and claiming that families of deserters, like young urban males, are
also diverse, fragmented segment of population).
169. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
170. Id. at 1577.
171. Id. at 1574-75.
172. See Graves, supra note 120, at 740 (describing analysis in Sanchez as internally
confused); accord Blum, supra note 52, at 86-87; Parish, supra note 20, at 942-43.
173. Blum, supra note 52, at 86-87; accord Parish, note 20, at 942-43 (stating that
only way to reconcile Sanchez-Trujillo's emphasis on voluntary association with Acosta's
requirement of immutability is to read Sanchez-Trujillo as "referring to groups defined
by a voluntary relationship which existed in the past").
174. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1571, 1576.
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tary.175 Furthermore, the purported social group in Sanchez-Tru-
fillo was defined in terms of age, sex and class; such characteris-
tics are not easily subject to manipulation by members of the
purported social group. 176 The court in Sanchez-Trujillo, how-
ever, neither addressed this fact nor cited to the BIA's holding in
In re Acosta, which required immutability in defining a particular
social group.' 7 In addition, the only group that has been recog-
nized as a particular social group by the Ninth Circuit since
Sanchez-Trujillo is one made up of individuals who faced persecu-
tion in El Salvador for retrieving the corpses of murder vic-
tims. 178 The group's members shared an immutable characteris-
tic: they had all participated in an activity that occurred in the
past.
79
Other circuit courts have stressed different factors in deter-
mining whether an individual is a member of a particular social
group. 80 These circuits, however, have failed to establish a for-
mal test.'8  In Ananeh-Firempong v. INS,'1 2 the U.S. Court of Ap-
175. Blum, supra note 52, at 86; accord Graves, supra note 120, at 781 (stating that
family blatantly fails to meet criteria set forth by court).
176. Blum, supra note 52, at 86.
177. Id. at 87. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986); accord
Parish, supra note 20, at 942-43 (stating that requirement of voluntary association can-
not be read literally or else it will directly contradict Acosta's immutability requirement).
According to Parish, Sanchez-Trujillo actually intended to define groups by a voluntary
relationship which existed in the past. Id. This type of relationship would connote
immutability. Id.
178. Valle-Zometa v. INS, No. 88-7174, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21167, at *19 (9th
Cir. Dec. 5, 1990).
179. Id.; see Parish, supra note 20, at 943 (citing Valle-Zometa as proof that Sanchez-
Trujillo recognized BIA's requirement of immutability by defining particular social
group as one marked by voluntary relationship that existed in past). This factor, com-
bined with the fact that the courts must respect BIA decisions, support the claim that
the Ninth Circuit did in fact give weight to immutability as an element in determining
what constitutes a particular social group. Id. at 942-43.
180. See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding persecutor's per-
ception of group important to determining whether particular social group exists);
Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding HANDBOOK and BIA
precedent important).
181. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 n.6 (9th Cir. 1986). The
court stated that "[w ] hatever the merits of the First Circuit's decision under the circum-
stances of that case, the decision provides no guidance as to the outer limits of the
'social group' category." Id.; see Parish, supra note 20, at 939-40 (stating that First Cir-
cuit failed to explain how it arrived at its decision and neglected to resolve which poten-
tial social groups it recognized); Graves, supra note 120, at 774 (using Ananeh-Firempong
as example of court's failure to define particular social group). Some circuit courts fail
to explain why the applicant's claim of membership in a particular social group fails.
E.g., Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1992) (declining to address whether
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peals for the First Circuit relied on the Handbook's language and
the holding in In re Acosta to hold that petitioner's membership
in her family, her tribal affiliation, her social class, and her polit-
ical views amounted to membership in a particular social
group. 183 Consistent with In re Acosta, the First Circuit empha-
sized that petitioner was persecuted because of characteristics
that were beyond her power to change. 184 Furthermore, the
court followed the Handbook in determining that individuals in-
cluded in these categories were of similar background, habits, or
social status.'85
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in Gomez v. INS,'86 declined to articulate a formal test for inter-
preting the phrase "membership in a particular Social group." 87
The Gomez court stated, however, that a particular social group
can be composed of individuals who possess a shared fundamen-
tal characteristic that distinguishes them in the eyes of either a
persecutor or in the eyes of the outside world.'88 Petitioner, a
Salvadoran woman, was raped five times by guerrillas during her
youth.'8 9 The court rejected her claim that she was a member of
a particular social group consisting of women who were previ-
ously raped and attacked by guerrillas. 9 ° The court stated that
gender and youth were the only characteristics common to her
applicant's family is social group); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1990)
(declining to expound on BIA's refusal to recognize former campesino cheesemakers
in El Salvador as a particular social group).
182. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
183. Id. In Ananeh-Firempong, there was a coup in Ghana while the petitioner, a
citizen of Ghana, was studying in the United States. Id. at 622-23. Consequently, the
new government persecuted those associated with the former government, members of
the Ashanti tribe, professionals, business people, and highly educated people. Id. at
623. Petitioner's family fell within all of these categories. Id. The government placed
petitioner's parents under house arrest, seized her family's bank account, interrupted
her family's telephone service, prevented her family from sending letters, and beat her
nephew. Id.
184. Id. at 626.
185. Id.
186. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
187. Id.; see Parish, supra note 20, at 940 (stating that Second Circuit in Gomez
eliminated claim without establishing positive definition).
188. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664. But see Blum, supra note 52, at 90 (stating that court
in Gomez recognizes importance of persecutor's perceptions but fails to apply them in
determining whether petitioner was member of particular social group).
189. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 662.
190. Id. at 663-64.
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purported particular social group.19' Therefore, further brutali-
zation was unlikely because the group lacked any characteristic
that persecutors could identify and single out.19 2
In Saleh v. United States Department of Justice,'93 the Second
Circuit again implied that a persecutor's perception is an impor-
tant factor in shaping a particular social group.1'9 Here, the
court implied that a particular social group might be evidenced
by laws enacted to persecute that group. 195 The court, citing
Gomez, denied petitioner's application for asylum noting that
neither of the two groups set forth by the petitioner was legally
singled out by the group's government. 96 Furthermore, the
court stated that neither of the two groups set forth by the peti-
tioner possessed sufficiently specific traits to be, considered rec-
ognizable and distinct.""
D. Homosexuals' Group Status in the United States
The U.S. government's treatment of homosexuals is a signif-
icant factor in analyzing the recognition of homosexuals as a
particular social group. In the United States, the executive and
legislative branches have recognized homosexuals as a distinct
group.'98 Furthermore, federal judges have considered homo-
sexuality an immutable characteristic. 9 9 Additionally, an un-
191. Id. at 664.
192. Id. The court stated that
[1] ike the traits which distinguish the other four enumerated categories-race,
religion, nationality and political opinion-the attributes of a particular social
group must be recognizable and discrete.
Id.
193. Saleh v. United States Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1992).
194. Id. at 240; see Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing significance of persecutor's perception in determining definition of par-
ticular social group).
195. Salekh, 962 F.2d at 240.
196. Id.
197. Id. The court stated that "both groups possess[ed] broadly-based characteris-
tics similar to 'youth and gender' that we held insufficient to identify a particular social
group in Gomez." Id.
198. See 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. 1, § H.l.a, b. (.1993) (banning homosexuals
from military); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4) (1988) (categorically excluding homosexuals from immigration) (re-
pealed 1990).
199. SeeJantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 at 1546-51 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding that
homosexuality is immutable and therefore homosexuals are suspect class for purposes
of equal protection claim), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir.); accord High
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1.990)
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published BIA decision and an Immigration Judge's decision
recognize homosexuals as a particular social group. °°
1. Treatment of Homosexuals as a Group by the
Federal Government
The federal government historically has treated homosexu-
als as a distinct group.2° 1 Immigration law and military proce-
dure reflect government policies that have, in the past, treated
homosexuals as a group.2 °2 In addition, Congress recently
passed legislation regarding bias-related crimes, °3 which treats
homosexuals as a group. °4
Until 1990, Congress categorically prohibited homosexuals
from entering the United States as immigrants.20 5 The Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act ("INA") denied any alien "afflicted with
psychopathic personality" entry into the United States.2 °6 In
Boutilier v. INS, °2 1 the Supreme Court held that the INA could
legally exclude homosexuals :because homosexuals had psycho-
pathic personalities.2 0 8 This exclusionary policy changed when
(Canby, J., dissenting) (arguing that homosexuality is immutable and therefore homo-
sexuals deserve classification as'suspect: class); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1989) (NorrisJ, concurring) (arguing that homosexuality is immutable).
200. See In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (BIA 1990) (on file at Fordham International
Law Journal).
201. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4) (1988) (categorically excluding homosexuals from immigration) (re-
pealed 1990); Enlisted Administrative Separations, 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. 1, § H.l.a.
(1992) (banning homosexuals from military).
202. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4)
(1988) (categorically excluding homosexuals from immigration) (repealed in 1990);
Enlisted Administrative Separations, 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. 1, § H.l.a. (1992) (ban-
ning homosexuals from military).
203. See Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534).
204. Id.
205. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4)
(1988) (repealed 1990)., See Samuel M. Silvers, TheExdusion and Expulsion of Homosexual
Aliens, 15 COLUM. Hum. Rrs. L. REv., 295 (1984) (providing thorough analysis of past
exclusionary policy towards homosexuals).
206. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (1992). The Immigration and Nationality Act denied
entry into the United States to aliens "afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual
deviation." Id.
207. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
208. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 120 (holding that section excluding aliens "afflicted with
psychopathic personality" was intended by Congress to exclude homosexuals).
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this section of the INA was repealed in 1990.09
Although President Clinton and the U.S. Pentagon recently
agreed to relax the policy banning discrimination against homo-
sexuals in the military, 10 the Department of Defense ("DOD")
regulations, until now, mandated that homosexuals be prohib-
ited from entering any branch of the military.211 These regula-
tions explicitly required the dishonorable discharge of service
persons who married a person of the same sex, stated that they
are a homosexual, or engaged in or solicited consensual bodily
contact with members of the same sex for sexual purposes.21 2 In
addition, until recently, the military induction form contained
questions about sexual orientation.213 'The DOD still believes
that homosexuals in the military jeopardize discipline, morale,
and public acceptability. 214
Furthermore, Congress addressed homosexuals as a group
209. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a) (4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (4) (1988) (repealed 1990).
210. See Thomas L. Friedman, President Admits Revised Policy Isn't Perfect, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 1993, at Al, A16 (setting forth the Pentagon's new policy guidelines on homo-
sexuals in the military); Thomas L. Friedman, Accord is Reached on Military Rules for Gay
Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1993, at Al.
211. 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41, App. A, pt. 1(H)(1)(a) (1993).. This regulation lists homo-
sexuality as a reason for "separation." Id. The definition of the term "separation" in-
cludes discharge, release from active duty, and release from custody and control of the
armed forces. 32 C.F.R. § 41.6 (1993). The regulation states that
[h]omosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the mil-
itary environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct ... seriously
impairs the accomplishment of the military mission.... Homosexual means a
person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to
engage in homosexual acts....
32 C.F.R. Pt. 41, App. A, pt. I(H)(1)(a), ,(b)(1) (1993); seeJanine M. Dascenzo and
Neal A. May, Cleaning Out the Pentagon's Closet: An Overiew of the Defense Department's
Anti-Gay Policy, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 433 (1992); NAN D. HUNTER ET. AL., THE RIGHTS OF
LEsBLAs AND GAY MEN 35-37 (1992) (discussing military policy toward homosexuals);
Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy: Text and Subtext,
46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1992) (providing thorough description of military's policy of
excluding homosexuals from service).
212. See 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41, App. A, pt.l(H) (1993).
213. See Gwen Ifill, Clinton Accepts Delay in Lifting Military Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1993, at Al.
214. 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41, App. A, pt. I(H)(1)(a) (1993). This regulation states that
[t]he presence of [homosexual] members adversely affects the ability of the
Military Services to maintain discipline, 'good order, and morale; to foster mu-
tual trust and confidence among servicemembers; to ensure the integrity of
the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide de-
ployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and work under close
conditions affording minimal privacy, to recruit and retain members of the
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when it passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act. 215 This act requires
the collection and publication of data about crimes that manifest
evidence of prejudice on account of "certain group characteris-
tics" including race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.2
16
2. Homosexuality as an Immutable Characteristic
If homosexuals possess a characteristic that the U.S. govern-
ment accepts as immutable, they can be considered a particular
social group. 1 7 In the United States, homosexuals classified as a
distinct group on the basis of their sexual orientation or their
status as homosexuals can be distinguished from homosexuals
characterized on the basis of homosexual conduct. 218 When ho-
Military Services; to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and to
prevent breaches of security.
Id.
See HUNTER, ET. AL., sipra note 211, at 35 (discussing fact that Department of Defense
bases its exclusionary practices on argument that homosexuality is incompatible with
military service); Eric Schmitt, Calm Analysis Dominates Panel Hearing on Gay Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1993, at Al (reporting that experts warn that "the bond that troops start
to establish in basic training would break under the strain of heterosexual and homo-
sexual soldiers sharing foxholes, barracks and close quarters aboard ship"); Eric
Schmitt, Months After Order on Gay Ban, Military is Still Resisting Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1993, at Al, A18 (citing five-officer Army team study warning that lifting ban on
homosexuals would damage recruiting to point that "the country may be forced to con-
sider abandoning the all-volunteer force and returning to conscription"); Eric Schmitt,
Military Cites Wue Range of Reasons for Its Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at Al (stat-
ing that military worried that lift of ban on homosexuals would jeopardize morale and
discipline, recruiting, cohesiveness among combat troops, personal privacy and even
increase the spread of Aids); Eric Schmitt, Joint Chiefs Fighting Clinton Plan to Allow Homo-
sexuals in Military, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at Al (stating that Joint Chiefs of Staff
oppose repealing ban on homosexuals in military because they believe the repeal
"would wreck morale, undermine recruiting, force devoutly religious service members
to resign and increase the risk of AIDS for heterosexual troops").
215. See Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534); see alsoJoseph M. Fernandez, Recent Development, Bring-
ing Hate Crime Into Focus - The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv.
261 (1991) (providing extensive overview of Act).
216. Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534). Under this act, "Sexual orientation" is defined' as consen-
sual homosexuality or heterosexuality. Id. In addition, the Act states that "[n ]othing in
this section creates a cause of action or a right to bring an action, including an action
based on 'discrimination due to sexual orientation. Id.
217. See Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (requiring immutability).
218. SeeJantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating that distinc-
tion between homosexual conduct and homosexual orientation is proper and useful in
analyzing constitutional rights of homosexuals), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623
(10th Cir.) (basing decision on qualified immunity of defendant), and cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2445 (1993); see also William Safire, On Language, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 14,
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mosexuality is viewed as behavioral, it is considered mutable be-
cause individuals can change their behavior.2 19 When viewed in
terms of status as opposed to behavior, however, homosexuality
is considered immutable.22 °
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick2 2 1 hold-
ing that a Georgia sodomy statute was constitutional, upheld a
statute against homosexual conduct, not status.2 22 In addition,
most U.S. circuit courts have viewed homosexuality as behav-
ioral223 and therefore as a mutable characteristic 4.2 2  These deci-
sions, however, contain concurring and dissenting opinions that
treat homosexuality as a status and therefore immutable.225
The minority decisions that characterize homosexuality as
immutable argue that homosexuals cannot change their sexual
1993, at 14 (stating that phrases "sexual preference" and "sexual orientation" "deal with
condition, not behavior, and can thus be referred to delicately as status in contrast to
activity"); Parish supra note 20, at 950-52 (discussing thoroughly, legitimate distinction
between identifying homosexuals by their status and identifying them by their con-
duct). For example, a homosexual can be celibate, and a heterosexual can have sexual
contact with partners of the same sex. Id. This Comment refers to homosexual status
and sexual, orientation interchangeably and as distinct from conduct.
219. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir.) (finding that homosexuality is behavioral and therefore not immutable), reh'g
denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that while blacks or women exhibit immutable characteristics,
homosexuality is primarily behavioral), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
220. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (arguing that sexual orientation is not matter of controlla-
ble choice and therefore is immutable); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (Norris,J., concurring) (stating that homosexuality is immutable), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
221. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (denying challenge to state anti-
sodomy statute).
222. Id.
223. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 (addressing equal protection claim, court
stated that "[h]omosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and
hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which
define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes"); Woodward v. United States,
871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reviewing equal protection claim, court stated
that "[m ] embers of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or women,
exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral in
character"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
224. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076. The Supreme
Court, however, has not ruled on this issue. Further, a majority of circuit courts have
also failed to address this question.
225. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1990) (Canby, J., dissenting); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Norris, J., concurring).
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orientation without immense difficulty.226 Furthermore, a dis-
trict court judge in Jantz v. Muc 227 pointed out that the circuit
court decisions finding that homosexuality is behavioral fail to
cite any scientific or medical authority supporting such conclu-
sions. 228 In contrast, this district court cited a number of scien-
tific articles concluding that sexual orientation generally cannot
be changed. 2 9 Thus, the court held that homosexuality is im-
mutable. 23 0
3. Claims of Persecution Based on Homosexuality and
Recognition of Homosexuals as a Particular Social Group
Claiming persecution on account of membership in a par-
ticular social group, homosexuals from numerous countries are
currently applying to the United States for asylum, refugee status
or for the suspension of deportation.23 ' One BIA decision and
one Immigration Judge's decision recognize homosexuals as
226. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (stating that it was not enough to say homosexu-
ality is behavioral); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Norris, J., concurring). Judge Canby, in High Tech Gays, argued that homosexuality is
immutable. High Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 377. In support of his argument, the judge
claimed that homosexuals do not choose to be attracted to members of their own sex.
Id. Sexual identity, thejudge stated, is established at a very early age and is not a matter
of conscious or controllable choice. Id. In Watkins, Judge Norris considered homosex-
uality immutable because changing it would require either a major physical change or
traumatic change of identity. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726. To support this argument, the
judge relies on scientific research demonstrating that individuals have little control over
their sexual orientation. Id. The judge asked
[w]ould heterosexuals living in a city that passed an ordinance burdening
those who engaged in or desired to engage in sex with persons of the opposite
sex find it easy not only to abstain from heterosexual activity but also to shift
the object of their sexual desires to persons of the same sex?
Id.
227. 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1547 n.3 (D.Kan. 1991) rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623
(10th Cir.) (basing decision on qualified immunity defense), and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2445 (1993).
228. Id.
229. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1547, 1547 n.4 (citing numerous sources).
230. Id. at 1551. But see Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 6 n.12 (D.D.C. 1991)
(holding that although causes and attributes of homosexuality are scientifically un-
known, homosexuality is not immutable because it is sometimes chosen by individuals).
This district court decision cited the lack of scientific evidence proving that homosexu-
ality is either mutable or immutable but left open the possibility that homosexuality, at
least sometimes, can not be chosen. Id.
231. See, e.g., In re "Chau," No. A71 039 582 (Immigration Judge, June 14, 1993)
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); see also Tuller and Levy, supra note
12 (stating that experts on immigration and gay and lesbian rights estimate 20 claims
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members of a particular social group.23 2 These decisions, how-
ever, are not binding onother Immigration Judges, other panels
of the BIA, or the federal courts.233
First, in 1990, in In re Toboso,23 4 the BIA upheld an Immigra-
tion Judge's decision to halt deportation proceedings against
Mr. Toboso-Alfonso, a gay Cuban man.235 Mr. Toboso testified
that he was subjected to recurring medical examinations and in-
terrogations that were given because he was a homosexual.23 6
During these interrogations, he was detained in the police sta-
tion for days at a time without a legitimate reason. 23 7 The appli-
cant further testified that he would be incarcerated because of
his sexual orientation if he returned to Cuba.238 The Immigra-
are pending for asylum based on sexual orientation but that INS does not keep statistics
on grounds which asylum is sought).
Thousands of aliens in the United States may have been persecuted in their coun-
try of origin because of their sexual orientation. See Tuller, supra note 5, at Al, A8; see
also In re Tenorio, No A72 093 558 at 8-11 (Immigration Judge July 26, 1993) (discuss-
ing persecution of homosexuals in Brazil);Joiro A. Marin, In Some Societies, to be Gay is to
be Dead, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at B7 (describing killing of homosexuals in Colum-
bia); Chris Nealson, Anti-gay Attacks Up in Peru, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Feb. 18-24, 1990,
at 2 (describing persecution of homosexuals in Peru); Debbie.Rich, Gay Men Tortured in
Romania, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Feb. 18-24, 1990, at 2 (reporting that gay men have
been arrested, interrogated and tortured in Romania); Susan Schmitz, Gay Executions in
Iran Continue, GAY COMMUNry NEWS, June 10-16, 1990 at 2 (describing persecution of
homosexuals in Iran); David Tuller and Dan Levy, Gay Rights on a Worldwide Front, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 24, 1992, at Al (stating that homosexuals are murdered in Mexico, im-
prisoned in Russia, executed in Iran and "disappeared" by death squads in Columbia);
Aras van Hertum, Amnesty International Report Warns of Abuse Against Gays, WASH. BLADE,
July 17, 1992 (describing persecution of gays in Columbia, Turkey, Brazil, Russia and
other former Soviet republics); Doris Sue Wong, More Gays Seeking US Asylum, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1992, at 13, 19 (stating that People's Republic of China has employed
electroshock and herbs that induce vomiting to discourage erotic thoughts).
232. In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal); In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (Immigration Judge July 26,
1993) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The BIA had the authority to
designate Toboso as a precedent decision but declined. See Letter from W. Lee Rawls,
Assistant Attorney General, to Barney Frank, United States Congressman, (July 2, 1992)
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
233. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1993); In re Ruis, 18 I. & N. Dec. 320, 321 (BIA 1982);
supra note 7 (discussing weight of BIA and Immigration Judge decisions).
234. In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal). Applicant claimed that the government was not acting
against specific acts by homosexuals, but merely against applicant's status as a homosex-
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tion Judge decided that the homosexual alien-applicant was per-
secuted on the basis of his status as a homosexual, as opposed to
homosexual conduct, and further, that homosexuality is an im-
mutable characteristic. 239 The Judge granted refugee status and
held that homosexuals constitute a particular social group.24°
The BIA affirmed this holding.241 While the In re Toboso decision
is not binding, the decision has not been challenged.
Furthermore, in June, 1993, the INS was confronted again
with the issue of whether homosexuals constitute a particular so-
cial group.242 In In re "Chau," the respondent was a bisexual
man from Hong Kong who came to the United States, over-
stayed his one-year visitor's visa and applied for asylum in the
United States.2 43 The respondent asserted that he feared perse-
cution on account of his membership in a particular social
group made up of the bisexual and homosexual community.244
The respondent testified that the Hong Kong Government
would imprison him for life if the government learned of his
sexual orientation. 245 Furthermore, he asserted that the Chinese
Government, which assumes control of Hong Kong in 1997, per-
secutes homosexuals through forms of electroshock therapy, la-
bor camps, imprisonment, and re-education in order to "cure"
them of their sexual orientation.246
The U.S trial attorney representing the INS explicitly stated
ual. Id. The BIA cited the applicant's testimony that there is a municipal office within
the Cuban Government which registers and maintains files on all homosexuals. Id.
The applicant would be required every few months to appear at a hearing at which he
would receive a physical examination and be interrogated about his sex life. Id. In
addition he could be detained for 3 or 4 days without being charged. Id. The applicant
further testified that he was threatened by the chief of police that if he did not leave
Cuba for the United States, he could spend four years in prison for being a homosex-
ual. Id.; see Tuller, supra note 4 at A8 (describing Toboso case).
239. In re Toboso, Dec. No. A23 220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
240. Id.
241. Id. The applicant was granted withholding of deportation but was denied
asylum only because of criminal record in the United States. Id. But see Tuller, supra
note 5, at Al, A8 (stating that it is believed that U.S.'s antipathy towards Cuba played
significant role in decision to grant withholding of deportation).
242. See In re "Chau," No. A71 039 582 (ImmigrationJudge June 14, 1993) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal). Respondent's real name is not revealed in
order to protect his identity.
243. In re "Chau" (manuscript at 2).
244. In re "Chau" (manuscript at 6).
245. Id.
246. In re "Chau" (manuscript at 7).
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that he would not raise the issue of whether homosexuals consti-
tute a particular social group.247 The attorney essentially con-
ceded to an Immigration Judge that persons claiming asylum on
the basis of persecution because of sexual orientation qualify as a
cognizable social group under the definition of "refugee."248 As
a result, the issue was narrowed to a factual determination of
whether Mr. Chau had a well-founded fear of persecution.249
The Immigration Judge determined that Mr. Chau did not sat-
isfy the persecution requirement and, therefore, Mr. Chau's ap-
plication for asylum was denied.25 °
Finally, on July 26, 1993, In re Tenorio was decided, recogniz-
ing homosexuals as a particular social group.25' In In re Tenorio,
an Immigration Judge in San Francisco, California, granted asy-
lum to the respondent, a Brazilian national who had been perse-
cuted in Brazil for being a homosexual. 25 2 Immigration Judge
Philip P. Leadbetter granted asylum on the grounds that homo-
sexuals constitute a particular social group.253 The decision
cited Re: Inaudi, as well as In re Acosta, Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, and
Ananeh-Firempong v. INS.254
Noting that reviewing a foreign country's finding on this is-
sue would be useful, the Immigration Judge discussed and
agreed with Canada's analysis in Re: Inaudi.255 In accordance
with Re: Inaudi, the Immigration Judge concluded that an associ-
ational relationship exists among homosexuals, homosexuals
share a common characteristic that is fundamental to their iden-
tity, and sexual orientation is arguably immutable.256 In re Te-
247. Telephone Interview with William SooHoo, Attorney for respondent in In re
"Chau" (July 17, 1993).
248. Id.
249. See In re "Chau" (manuscript 17-27).
250. Id.
251. In re Tenorio, No. A72.093 558 (Immigration Judge July 26, 1993) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
252. Id. at 4-7. Respondent testified that he was beaten, stabbed, robbed and ver-
bally abused while waiting for a bus after attending a gay discotheque. Id. at 4-5. His
persecutors called him a "faggot" and "gay." Id. at 5. Respondent stated that he did not
report the attack to the police because he believed it might have been police officers
who attacked him. Id. at 6. In addition, respondent was turned down from a job be-
cause he admitted to the potential employer that he was a homosexual. Id. at 7.
253. Id. at 14.
254. Id. at 11-14.
255. Id. at 14.
256. Id.
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norio, however, is not binding on any other Immigration Judge,
the BIA, or the Federal Courts. In addition, the INS is appealing
the decision.
II. RE: INAUDI
In Re: Inaudi, Mr. Jorge Alberto Inaudi, a 28-year-old Argen-
tine, was persecuted by the Argentine government because of his
homosexuality.2 57 He fled Argentina, his country of origin, and
sought asylum in Canada because of continuous and abusive
treatment by Argentine government authorities.5 8 Mr. Inaudi
argued that he was a persecuted homosexual, that homosexuals
were a particular social group, and that, therefore, he was a
"Convention refugee." 59 The Canadian CRDD of the IRB held
that Mr. Inaudi satisfied the definition of "Convention refugee"
because homosexuals constitute a particular social group.
26
A. The Facts of the Case
Mr. Inaudi had been persecuted because of his homosexual-
ity since he was a child.261 As an adult, when Mr. Inaudi served
in the Argentine military, he was blackmailed and incarcerated
by military authorities for eight days because of his romantic re-
lationship with another soldier. After his military service, gov-
ernment officials continued to harass Mr. Inaudi.263
Mr. Inaudi was arrested by the police on numerous occa-
sions while patronizing gay bars. 26 Each time, the police de-
tained Mr. Inaudi and abused him because of his sexual orienta-
tion. 65 On several of these occasions the police beat, sexually
abused, or robbed Mr. Inaudi after they arrested him. 66 In ad-
257. Re: Inaudi, I.R.B. No. T91-04459 at 1-4 (Apr. 9, 1992).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1. Mr. Inaudi "suffered humiliation and degradation" at boarding
school because he was a homosexual. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 2-4 (describing claimant's being arrested, blackmailed, beaten and ver-
bally abused by the police).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. Mr. Inaudi alleged that on one occasion, he was
beaten with billy clubs and fists, stripped, sodomized, blindfolded, tied to the
walls in spread eagle fashion, given electric shock and then was forced to listen
[Vol. 17:229
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dition to physical abuse, Mr. Inaudi was also blackmailed and
compelled to bribe police officers in order to guarantee that his
homosexuality remained secret.267 As a result of these events,
Mr. Inaudi left Argentina and sought refuge in Canada,268 where
he applied for political asylum.269
B. The Canadian Immigration andRefugee Board's Analysis
A panel of the IRB heard Mr. Inaudi's request for asylum.2
70
The issue before the IRB was whether Mr. Inaudi's fear of perse-
cution was based on a Convention reason.2 7 1 The IRB held that
Mr. Inaudi was a Convention refugee 272 because he was perse-
cuted on account of his homosexuality and homosexuals are a
particular social group.273
The IRB analyzed two concepts to determine the definition
of a particular social group in general, and why homosexuals, in
particular, fall within this definition.274 First, the alleged mem-
bers of a particular social group must possess an immutable
characteristic. 75 Second, the purported members of a social
to others being tortured in the same manner.... While he was unconscious
he was dumped on the side of a road under a bridge, naked, with his clothes
next to him.
Id. at 3-4.
267. Id. at 2-4. One time, the police notified Mr. Inaudi's landlady of Mr. Inaudi's
homosexuality and he was evicted from his apartment. Id. at 1-2. On another occasion,
Mr. Inaudi did not have enough money to bribe the police. Consequently, the police
informed, his employer and co-workers that he was gay. The humiliation Mr. Inaudi
suffered compelled him to resign from his job. Id. at 2. On yet another occasion, a
police officer informed Mr. Inaudi's employer of his homosexuality. This employer
subsequently told fellow. employees that Mr. Inaudi was a homosexual, and fired Mr.
Inaudi. Id. at 3. Furthermore, Mr. Inaudi's family learned of Mr. Inaudi's homosexual-
ity after one of Mr. Inaudi's arrests, and his father renounced him. Id. at 4.
268. Id. at 4.
269. Canada Grants Political Asylum to Oppressed Argentinean Gay, BAY AREA REP., Jan.
23, 1992.
270. See Re: Inaudi, I.RLB. No. T91-04459 (Apr. 9, 1992).
271. Id. at 4. The presiding member of the Immigration and Refugee Board held
that, based on the record of facts, there was no question that Inaudi was persecuted. Id.
272. Id. at 10.
273. Id. at 4-10. Even the dissent agrees that Inaudi was a member of a particular
social group because of his homosexual orientation, finding that his homosexuality
.constitutes an innate and fundamental personal characteristic" and that
"[h]omosexuals have a pattern of social interaction and share some common under-
standings." Id. at 11. The dissent only disputes the panel's holding that Inaudi was at
risk of persecution. Id. at 11-19.
274. Id. at 5-6.
275. Id.
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group need to share the degree of similarity required by the stat-
ute defining "refugee."276
The IRB stated that if homosexuality is an immutable char-
acteristic, then homosexuals constitute a particular social
group. 2 7 Citing a decision of the Federal Administrative Court
of the Federal Republic of Germany278 and an analysis of Veysey
v. Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada2 7 9 the IRB illus-
trated that sexual orientation can be considered immutable.
The IRB held that homosexuals constitute a particular social
group, therefore implying that the IRB accepted the fact that
homosexuality is immutable.28 °
The IRB first relied on the case decided by the Federal Ad-
ministrative Court of the Federal Republic of Germany to
demonstrate that homosexuality has been considered immuta-
ble.28' In this case, the Federal Administrative Court of Ger-
many held that homosexuality, if considered an irreversible, per-
sonal characteristic could be grounds for asylum.2a2 The IRB
stated that the German court appeared to have accepted that
homosexuality is an immutable characteristic. 28 3
Second, the IRB relied on James C. Hathaway's 2 4 analysis of
Veysey v. Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada.8 5 Mr.
Hathaway stated that Veysey applied the doctrine of ejusdem
generis in holding that homosexuality was at least as immutable as
276. Id. at 5.
277. Id. at 6.
278. Id. (citing 1 Irr'LJ. REFUGEE L. 110 (1989) (summarizing German case)).
279. Id. (citingJAMEs C. HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STATUS 163-164 (1991)
(analyzing Veysey v. Commissioner of the Correctional Serv. of Canada (1989), 1 F.C.
321 (FCTD)). Re: Inaudi does not cite any Canadian precedent applying asylum law in
its analysis of whether homosexuals should be considered a particular social group
within the definition of "refugee." See Re: Inaudi I.R.B. No. T91-04459 (Apr. 9, 1992).
280. Id. Ethel Teitelbaum of the IRB stated, "[i]f I accept (as the German court
and Mr. Justice Dube have) that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic, that
alone, in my opinion, suffices to place homosexuals in a particular social group." Id.
281. Id. at 5 (citing I INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 110 (1989) (summarizing German case)).
In this case, an Iranian citizen claimed that he was in danger of being executed in Iran
because he was a homosexual. I INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 110 (1989).
282. 1 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 110. The court in the German court case, however, did
not directly address the definition of a "particular social group because it assessed the
plaintiff's claim within context of political opinion. Id.
283. Re: Inaudi at 5.
284. Author of THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (1991).
285. Re: Inaudi at 6 (citing JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, at
163-164 (1991) (analyzing Veysey v. Commissioner of the Correctional Serv. of Canada
(1989), 1 F.C. 321 (FCTD)).
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race, national or ethnic origin, color, age, religion, sex, or
mental or physical disability. 86 As a result, he concluded that
Veysey provided the basis for treating sexual orientation as an im-
mutable characteristic capable of defining a social group.28
According to the IRB, even if homosexuality is considered a
voluntary condition, it is one so fundamental to a person's iden-
tity that a claimant ought not be compelled to change it.2 88 As a
result, the IRB implied that whether homosexuality is immutable
or voluntary, homosexuals are members of a particular social
group.2 89
The IRB also examined the statutory language defining a
refugee in determining that homosexuals qualify as Convention
refugees.20° Noting that Canada's Immigration Act does not de-
fine the phrase "particular social group," the IRB referred to the
interpretation provided by the Handbook.291 The Handbook states
that a particular social group requires similar background, habits
or social status.292 The IRB stated that homosexuals possess a
sufficient degree of similarity.293
Furthermore, the IRB examined the plain meaning of the
words "social" and "group" as defined by the Oxford English Dic-
tionary.294 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "social" as pos-
sessing the capability of being associated or united.2 95 In addi-
tion, the dictionary defines "group" as a number of persons
classed together on the basis of a certain degree of similarity.296
The IRB concluded that homosexuals clearly are capable of be-
ing associated or united because homosexuals possess a certain
degree of similarity.29 7 This similarity stems from their attraction
286. HATHAWAY, supra note 78, at 163-64.
287. Id.
288. Re: Inaudi at 5.
289. Id.
290. Id. (analyzing language in Canadian Immigration Act).
291. Id. (citing HANDBOOK); see HANDBOOK, supra note 34, 1 77.
292. HANDBOOK, supra note 34, 1 77 ("A 'particular social group' normally com-
prises persons of similar background, habits or social status").
293. Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 5 (I.R.B.).
294. Id. at 5 (citing OxFoRD ENGLISH DICrIoNARY).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. The Board stated
[h]omosexuals are classed together on account of a certain degree of similar-
ity, i.e. that they are attracted to persons of their own gender. I therefore find
1993]
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to persons of their own gender.298 The IRB stated that therefore
homosexuals, whether they are male or female, are members of
a particular social group.2
99
The IRB held that homosexuals form a particular social
group.300 Therefore, the IRB found Mr. Inaudi to be a Conven-
tion refugee. 30 1 Although the Minister of Employment and Im-
migration could have appealed the decision to Canada's federal
courts, he did not. 0 2
III. RE: INAUDI SHOULD INFLUENCE U.S. REFUGEE POLICY
The BIA and U.S courts should rely on Re: Inaudi to recog-
nize that homosexuals constitute a particular social group for
purposes of satisfying the definition of "refugee." The IRB's
analysis in Re: Inaudi demonstrates that the United States can
include homosexuals in its definition of "refugee" without
broadening or modifying its interpretation of a particular social
group.303 The analysis provided in Re: Inaudi is not only consis-
tent with U.S. interpretations of the phrase "particular social
group" previously set out by the BIA and federal courts, but Re:
Inaudi integrates into its reasoning the various factors applied in
the United States to define a "particular social group." In addi-
tion, because the U.S. government historically has treated homo-
sexuals as a distinct group 3 0 4 and federal judges recognize homo-
sexuality as an immutable trait,30 5 labeling homosexuals as a par-
ticular social group for refugee status only would entail
that homosexuals, be they male or female, are members of a particular social
group.
Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 5.
301. Id. at 10.
302. See Farnsworth, supra note 90 (stating that I.R.B. decisions are usually final).
303. Compare Re: Inaudi (holding that homosexuals constitute particular social
group) with Saleh v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 962 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1992) (relying
on factors similar to that relied on in Re: Inaudi to determine what constitutes particular
social group) and Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (demonstrat-
ing that U.S. analysis is similar to Re: Inaudi) and Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d
621 (1st Cir. 1985) and In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. (BIA 1985) (focusing on immuta-
bility, similarly to Canadian Board in Re: Inaudi).
304. See supra notes 201-16 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. immigration,
military, and criminal law that classifies homosexuals as group).
305. See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text (setting out federal judges' ar-
guments that homosexuality is immutable).
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application of well-established policy. Furthermore, that an Im-
migration Judge has actually cited Re: Inaudi demonstrates the
decision's significance and implies that the United States is will-
ing to adopt Re: Inaudi.3 6
A. Re: Inaudi Is Consistent with U.S. Standards
1. The BIA Standard
Because the Canadian IRB determined that, pursuant to the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, a particular social group is formed by
an immutable trait, Re: Inaudi is consistent with the BIA standard
for determining a particular social group.307 The Canadian IRB
explained immutability as a characteristic that is either virtually
irreversible or so fundamental to the identity of an individual
that it should not be required to be changed. °8 The Canadian
IRB held that homosexuality is immutable and even if it is con-
sidered voluntary, it is so fundamental to an individual's identity
that an individual ought not be required to change it.30 9 As a
result, the Canadian IRB held that homosexuals constitute a par-
ticular social group.310
The Canadian IRB's standard is consistent with the interpre-
tation of a particular social group applied by the U.S. BIA in In re
Acosta.31 Similarly to the IRB, in In re Acosta, the BIA applied
the doctrine of ejusdem generis to define a particular social
group.31 In addition, like the Canadian IRB, the BIA concluded
that members of a particular social group should share an immu-
table characteristic.313 Furthermore, the BIA similarly defined
immutability as a trait impossible to change or so fundamental to
one's identity that it ought not be required to be changed. 1 4
306. See In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 at 14 (Immigration Judge 1993).
307. Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 6 (I.R.B.); see supra notes 119-41
and accompanying text (setting forth BIA standard).
308. Supra notes 277-87 (discussing Re: Inaudi's finding that homosexuality is im-
mutable).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Compare Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 (I.R.B.) (finding that ho-
mosexuality can be considered immutable, and therefore homosexuals constitute par-
ticular social group) with In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (defining
particular social group as group shaped by immutable characteristic). See supra notes
119-41 and accompanying text (discussing Acosta).
312. Acosta, I. & N. Dec. at 233.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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Therefore, Re: Inaudi provides the United States with an appli-
cation of its own standard and should convince the BIA to recog-
nize homosexuals as a particular social group.
2. The Federal Courts
The Canadian IRB's decision and analysis is also consistent
with the standard applied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.315 First, the Canadian IRB examined relevant stat-
utory language and found that the plain meaning of "social" and
"group" required a certain degree of similarity among individu-
als."16 Re: Inaudi cited the Oxford English Diciionary's definition of
"social" as "capable of being associated or united," while
"group," according to the dictionary, was defined as "a number
of persons classed together on account of a certain degree of
similarity."317 Honmosexuals, according to the Canadian IRB,
meet this level of similarity because they share an attraction to
persons of their own gender .3 1
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, stated that the phrase "particular social
group" connotes "a collection of people closely affiliated" and
sharing "some common impulse or interest."31 9 Because the
Ninth Circuit has adopted a very similar definition of social
group, it would not have to reinterpret the Refugee Act of 1980
to find that homosexuals constitute a particular social group.
Second, the IRB stated that even if homosexuality is volun-
tary, homosexuals still constitute a particular social group.
320
315. Compare Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9,, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 5 (I.RB.) (relying on
persecutor's perception, HANDBOOK, and statutory language to conclude that even if
homosexuality is voluntary, homosexuals constitute particular social group) with Saleh
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 240 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing persecu-
tor's perception in its analysis) and Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991)
(recognizing persecutor's perception as important in determining particular social
group) and Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that
existence of "voluntary associational relationship" is essential to finding particular social
group in its analysis of what constitutes particular social group) and Ananeh-Firempong
v. I.N.S., 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (relying on HANDBOOK, supra note 34, and In
re Acosta in its decision).
316. Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 5 (I.R.B.).
317. Id.
318. Id.; supra notes 294-99 and accompanying text (analyzing Re: Inaudi).
319. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir., 1986); see supra notes
145-71 and accompanying text (discussing Sanchez-Trujio).
320. Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 5 (I.R.B.).
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The Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-Trujillo stated that voluntary associa-
tion was central to the formation of a particular social group.3 2'
Therefore, the court's emphasis on voluntary association is con-
sistent with the Canadian IRB's reasoning that voluntary traits
can form a particular social group.322
Finally, the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-Trujillo stated that a
family was a prototype of a particular social group, implying that
the inability to disassociate oneself from other members of the
group may underlie its decision despite the court's emphasis on
voluntary association'323  If this factor was determinative in
Sanchez-Trujillo, Re: Inaudi still remains consistent with the Ninth
Circuit analysis because the Canadian Board held that homosex-
uals constitute a particular social group whether homosexuality
is considered voluntary or immutable. s 4
Re: Inaudi also addressed the same concerns articulated by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Ananeh-
Firempong v. INS: whether homosexuality is immutable and
whether homosexuals satisfy the Handbook's definition of a par-
ticular social group.3 25 According to the Canadian IRB in Re:
Inaudi, homosexuality can be considered immutable. 26 In addi-
tion, Re: Inaudi found that homosexuals possess the requisite
level of similarity required by the Handbook.3 27
Unlike the Canadian IRB, however, neither the U.S. federal
courts nor the BIA has relied on foreign cases to define a partic-
ular social group.3 28 Although the United States has not been
influenced by foreign decisions, the BIA and courts are more
321. See Sanchez-Trujilio, 801 F.2d at 1576. But see Blum; supra note 52, at 86-87
(stating that immutability seems to have been more relevant criteria underlying Ninth
Circuit's decision in Sanchez)' Parish, supra note 20, at 942-43 (stating that Sanchez must
be read as "referring to groups defined by a voluntary relationship which existed in the
past").
322. Re: Inaudi at 5. But see Blum, supra note 52, at 91 (stating that under Ninth
Circuit's "voluntary association" test, homosexuals could be excluded).
323. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576; see Blum, supra note 52, at 86; supra notes
173-79 and accompanying text (discussing Sanchez-Trujillo's implied reliance on immu-
tability as factor in its analysis).
324. Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 5 (I.R.B.).
325. Compare id. at 5-6 (addressing importance of immutability and citing HAND-n
BOOK, supra note 33) with Ananeh-Firempong v. I.N.S., 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985)
(citing In re Acosta and HANDBOOK).
326. Re: Inaudi at 5.
327. Id. 4-5.
328. But see In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (Immigration Judge 1991) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (citing Re: Inaudi).
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likely to be influenced by a Canadian decision because the
United States and Canada have similar cultures and a common
legal tradition, and are geographically contiguous." 9 Therefore,
this difference between the U.S. and Canadian analyses should
not preclude U.S. courts and administrative agencies from fol-
lowing Re: Inaudi.
Re: Inaudi is consistent with the standards set forth by the
U.S. BIA and the federal courts.33 0 The Canadian Board, like
these authorities, addressed immutability, voluntary association,
the plain meaning of the statutory language defining "refugee,"
and the Handbook's definition of a particular social group. 331
Considering these factors, the Canadian Board determined that
homosexuals constitute a particular social group.3 2 Therefore,
U.S. courts and the BIA should be convinced that homosexuals
are members of a particular social group.
B. The U.S. Government's View of Homosexuality Supports a Finding
that Homosexuals Constitute a Particular Social Group
Aliens from various parts of the world allege that, in their
329. See Farnsworth, supra note 90, at A5 (quoting law professor at University of
Toronto as saying that Re: Inaudi is important new precedent for United States).
330. Re: Inaudi is also consistent with many American commentators' views that
the judiciary and BIA should interpret the scope of a particular social group more
broadly than it has been by the BIA and the circuit courts. See Helton, supra note 118.
Arthur Helton stated that "the contours of a social group for purposes of refugee status
are limited only by the imagination of the persecutor." Id. at 66; accord Daniel
Compton, Note, Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar-
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986), 62 WASH. L. Rxv. 913 (1987) (criti-
cizing Sanchez-Trujillo test as too narrow and advocating broader standard which consid-
ers the perceptions and actions of the persecutor); Graves, supra note 117, at 740.41
(stating that neither courts nor BIA should reduce asylum eligibility to level narrower
than broad and flexible standard intended by Congress); David L. Neal, Note, Women as
a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 203 (1988) (arguing that phrase has catch-all type purpose and therefore
should be extended to women if persecuted on account of their sex); see also Parish,
supra note 20, at 944-47 (advocating broader definition of particular social group, but
with some limits). In fact, one leading commentator on this issue advocates that any
group perceived by the government as deserving persecution should be considered a
particular social group. See, e.g., Helton, supra note 118, at 45-46, 51, 60. "The 'social
group, category was meant to be a catch-all which could include all the bases for and
types of persecution which an imaginative despot might conjure up." Id. at 45. Fur-
thermore, "the presumption must be that it was intended that all victims of capricious
persecution... be included in the 'social group' category." Id. at 46.
331. See Re: Inaudi, (Apr. 9, 1992) No. T91-04459 at 4-8 (I.R.B.).
332. Id.
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countries of origin, homosexuals are persecuted on account of
their sexual orientation.3 3 These aliens are seeking protection
in the United States claiming that they are members of a particu-
lar social group comprised of homosexuals."3 4 Whether homo-
sexuals will be considered a particular social group depends sig-
nificantly on how the U.S. government views homosexuality. 3 5
1. The U.S. Government Treats Homosexuals as a
Distinct Group
The U.S. government has historically treated homosexuals
as a distinct group.336 The INA categorically excluded homosex-
uals from immigration until 1990.137 Under this policy, homo-
sexuals were banned because they were viewed as having psycho-
pathic personalities.3 38 Additionally, the DOD's traditional pol-
icy of banning homosexuals from the military demonstrates that
the Pentagon viewed homosexuals as a distinct social group. 3 9
The U.S. government's current treatment of homosexuals,
however, demonstrates a more favorable attitude toward homo-
sexuals. The U.S. government, while still recognizing homosex-
uals as a group, is beginning to recognize that homosexuals have
been unjustifiably discriminated against.3 4 President Clinton's
recent efforts to repeal the ban against homosexuals in the mili-
333. See supra note 231 (providing articles reporting persecution of homosexual in
other countries).
334. Id.
335. See, e.g., Wong, supra note 5, at 19 (stating that extent to which homosexuals
will be granted asylum on account of their homosexuality depends on extent to which
homosexuality is sanctioned in United States). '
336. See supra notes 201-16 and accompinying text (describing how U.S. immigra-
tion, military, and criminal law address homosexuals as group).
337. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (1988) (categorically excluding homosexuals from
immigration) (repealed 1990).
338. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (discussing Boutilier v. INS, 387
U.S. 118 (1967)).
339. 32 C.F.1R Pt. 41, App. A, pt. I(H)(1)(a) (1993) (banning homosexuals from
military).
340. While homosexuals are not considered a suspect or quasi-suspect class under
the Equal Protection Clause of-the Constitution, see, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that homosexuals
are not suspect or quasi-suspect class for purposes of Equal Protection Clause of Consti-
tution); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (concluding that homosexuals
are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class with regard to Equal Protection Clause of Consti-
tution), the Ninth Circuit, in Pruitt v. Cheney; refused to defer to military judgment
when military policy was challenged on equal protection grounds. Pruitt v. Cheney, 943
F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1991). The court remanded the case to district court and directed
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tary, for example, reflects the administration's recognition that
the government no longer should persecute this group. 341 The
repeal of the exclusionary policies toward homosexuals in immi-
gration also reflects a more favorable attitude towards homosex-
uals. 42  In addition, the Hate Crime Statistics Act's includes
homosexuals.3 43 This law reflects an understanding that homo-
sexuals are potential victims of discrimination and therefore
need protection.
2. Homosexuality Is Considered Immutable
Federal judges, in areas other than immigration, have ar-
the court to apply "active" rationality test to determine whether anti-gay military policies
are "rationally related to permissible government purpose." Id. at 996.
Furthermore, in Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, a district court judge held
that the Department of Defense is "permanently enjoined from discharging or denying
enlistment to any person based on sexual orientation in the absence of sexual conduct
which interferes with the military mission of the armed forces of the United States."
808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal 1993). To do so, reasoned the court, would violate the
Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.; see alsoJanine M. Dascenzo and
Neal A. May, Cleaning Out the Pentagon's Closet: An Overview of the Defense Department's
Anti-Gay Policy 23 U. TOL. L. Rlv. 433 (arguing that homosexuals should be considered
suspect class); Chad S. Johnson, Note, A Judicial Blow to the Military's Anti-Gay Policies:
Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1991), 27 HAlv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 244, 261 (1992)
(arguing that Ninth Circuit realized need to "disentrench the cycle of homophobia and
discrimination within the military establishment"); Mark Stasser, Suspect Classes and Sus-
pect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEM. L. REv. 937, 938
(1991) (arguing that "neither the Court nor society can afford to pay the costs associ-
ated with the Court's refusal to recognize that homosexuals constitute a suspect class");
Dirk Johnson, Colorado's Anti-Gay Measure Set Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at A8 (re-
porting that the Colorado State Supreme Court held that a measure against gay rights
appeared to violate the equal protection clause of U.S. Constitution).
341. See The Pentagon's New Policy Guidelines on Homosexuals in the Military, N.Y.
TiMES, July 20, 1993, at A16. The Pentagon's new policy states, for example, that appli-
cants will no longer be asked or required to reveal if they are homosexual, sexual orien-
tation will not be a bar to service unless manifested by homosexual conduct, and no
investigations will be conducted solely to determine a service member's sexual orienta-
tion. Id. The new policy attempts to distinguish between homosexual status and homo-
sexual conduct. Thomas L. Friedman, Accord is Reached on Military Rules for Gay Soldiers,
N.Y. TiMES, July 17, 1993, at Al, A7. Homosexual status will be condoned if kept dis-
creet, while homosexual conduct most likely will lead to an investigation and discharge.
Id.
342. See Wong, supra note 5, at 19 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank for proposition that
because homosexuals are no longer barred from immigrating to United States, they
should be eligible for asylum).
343. See Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534).
344. See Parish, supra note 20, at 950 n.151.
19931 RE: INA UDI 273
gued that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic."4 5 A
Ninth Circuit judge argued that homosexuality is inherent.4 6
This judge stated that homosexuality is immutable because it
cannot be changed without immense difficulty.347  Another
Ninth Circuit judge stated that homosexuality is immutable be-
cause it would require a traumatic change of identity, citing sci-
entific authority supporting the fact that individuals have little
control over their sexual orientation. 34  Additionally, circuit
court decisions rejecting the claim that homosexuality is immu-
table have been attacked on the ground that their conclusions
are not supported by credible evidence.4 9
Although the Supreme Court denied'a constitutional chal-
lenge to sodomy statutes in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision fo-
cused on homosexual conduct rather than status.350 In Bowers v.
Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that statutes prohibiting sod-
omy are Constitutional. 5' Such statutes prohibit homosexual
conduct.35 2  In contrast, homosexuals seeking asylum in the
United States claim that their countries of origin persecute them
on account of their Status as homosexuals. 53 The Supreme
Court, in fact, has held that statutes criminalizing status, such as
drug addiction, are unconstitutional.354  Therefore, Bowers does
345. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Ind. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (arguing that homosexuality is immutable); Watkins v.
United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (arguing that
homosexuality is immutable).
346.. High Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 377.
347. Id.
348. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726.
349. SeeJantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1547, n.3 (D. Kan. 1991) (arguing that
Circuit decisions holding homosexuality is immutable were devoid of scientific sup-
port). rev'd on othergrounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992) and cert denied, 113 S.Ct. 2445
(1993).
350. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that anti-sodomy statute
was constitutional).
351. Id.
352. See id. at 190-96 (upholding statute prohibiting private, consensual sodomy);
HUNTER, ET A ., supra note 211, at 148-75 (providing state-by-state compilation of con-
sensual sodomy statutes and related laws).
353. See supra notes 231-56 and accompanying text (describing claims by homosex-
uals of persecution on account of sexual orientation).
354. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that statute mak-
ing "status" of narcotic addiction, as opposed to use, purchase, sale or possession of
narcotics, criminal offense inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Four-
teenth Amendment); see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
Justice Black states:
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not undermine a policy to protect homosexuals from persecu-
tion on account of their status as homosexuals.3 55
4. Homosexuals Have Been Considered a Particular
Social Group
In In re Toboso, the BIA held that homosexuals are a particu-
lar social group for purposes of satisfying the definition "refu-
gee. '"356 The BIA upheld an Immigration Judge's decision that
petitioner was persecuted on account of his status as a homosex-
ual, not his conduct.35 7 This case demonstrates that the adminis-
trative authority in charge of refugee claims believes that homo-
sexuality is immutable.358
In addition, the U.S. trial attorney representing the INS in
In re "Chau" essentially conceded to an Immigration Judge, by
not raising the issue, that persons claiming asylum on the basis
of persecution for sexual orientation qualify as a cognizable so-
cial group under the definition of "refugee. '35 9 The attorney's
concession does not mean necessarily that other U.S. attorneys
who represent the INS also will concede that persons persecuted
for their sexual orientation constitute a particular social
group.360 The attorney's concession in In re "Chau," however, is
persuasive authority.36'
Furthermore, on July 26, 1993, an Immigration Judge actu-
ally relied on Re: Inaudi to hold that homosexuals constitute a
Punishment for a status is particularly obnoxious, and in many instances can
reasonably be called cruel and unusual, because it involves punishment for a
mere propensity, a desire to commit an offense; the mental element is not
simply one part of the crime but may constitute all of it. This is a situation
universally sought to be avoided in our criminal law....
Id. at 543.
Important to the Court's holding in Robinson was the fact that the Court considered
drug addiction involuntary. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
355. See Parish, supra note 20, at 951-53. But see Wong, supra note 5, at 19 (imply-
ing that Bowers is obstacle for homosexuals applying for asylum).
356. In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal); see supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text (discussing
Toboso).
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text (discussing Matter of "Peter
Chau").
360. Telephone Interview with Mr. William SooHoo, Attorney for the respondent
in In re "Chau" (Mar. 12, 1993).
361. Id.
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particular social group. 62 In re Tenorio has two significant impli-
cations. First, In re Tenorio provides another authority that can
be relied on to hold that homosexuals constitute a particular so-
cial group. The more decisions there are, the more persuaded
other Immigration Judges, panels of the BIA, and the federal
courts should be. Second, In re Tenorio cited Re: Inaudi,63 dem-
onstrating that the U.S. agrees with Re: Inaudi and is willing to
adopt its analysis and holding.
In re Toboso, In re "Chau," and In re Tenorio support the argu-
ment that the BIA and federal courts should recognize homosex-
uals as a particular social group. Re: Inaudi, however, provides
more thorough and detailed reasoning for holding that homo-
sexuals constitute a particular social group. 64 In In re Toboso the
BIA found that the applicant was persecuted for being homosex-
ual, that homosexual status is immutable, and, therefore, that
homosexuals constitute a particular social group.365 The deci-
sion neither cites precedent nor provides an in-depth analysis
explaining its holding. 66 Additionally, In re "Chau" does not ad-
dress at all why homosexuals should be considered a particular
social group.367 Furthermore, while In re Tenorio cites In re
Acosta, Sanchez-Trujillo, and Ananeh-Firempong, the decision in In
re Tenorio merely states the holdings in these cases without draw-
ing any conclusions or applying them to the claimant at issue. 68
The Immigration Judge in In re Tenorio, instead, relies on Re:
Inaudi to determine whether homosexuals constitute a particu-
lar social group.369
362. In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (Immigration Judge July 26, 1993) (on file
with the Fordham International LawJournal); see supra notes 251-56 and accompanying
text (discussing Tenorio).
363. Id. at 14.
364. Compare supra notes 270-302 and accompanying text (setting forth Re: Inaudi's
decision) with supra notes 234-56 and accompanying text (discussing holdings in Toboso,
In re "Chau", and Tenorio).
365. In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 at 4 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990).
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text (discussing In re "Chau").
368. In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 at 11-14 (Immigration Judge July 26, 1993)
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
369. Id. at 14. The Immigration Judge stated, "[i]n order to determine whether
homosexuals as a group is the type of 'social group' for which the immigration laws
provide protection from persecution, it may be useful to review a foreign country's
finding on this issue .... This court is in agreement with [Re: Inaudi's] analysis....
Thus, homosexuals are considered to be members of a particular social group." Id.
1993]
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5. The United States Will Not Become a Haven for
All Homosexuals
If homosexuals are held to constitute a particular social
group, the United States will not be obliged to open its doors as
a haven for all homosexuals. 370 Each person who applies for asy-
lum must satisfy the other requirements set out by the definition
of "refugee" in the Refugee Act of 1980.71 Therefore, neither
the courts nor the BIA should reject homosexuals' claims of per-
secution on account of membership in a particular social group
for fear of a flood of these refugees.
CONCLUSION
Holding that homosexuals constitute a particular social
group is consistent with BIA and federal court precedent, and
treatment of homosexuals by the federal government. Thus far
the definition of a particular social group has not been applied
to its full potential. The stage is set for homosexuals to be recog-
nized in the United States as a particular social group and
thereby obtain refugee status. The BIA and Federal Courts
should adopt the reasoning in Re: Inaudi and hold that homo-
sexuals constitute a particular social group.
Ellen Vagelos*
370. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Canada Refugee Ruling in Favor of Gay Man May Affect
U.S. Cases, HOUSTON CHRON.,Jan. 19, 1992, at A21 (quoting lawyer in Re: Inaudi case as
saying that Re: Inaudi does not mean Canada will suddenly become haven for all homo-
sexuals claiming refugee status because homosexuals will have to prove persecution,
not merely harassment); Graves, supra note 117, at 781-83 (arguing that there is no
statutory basis for denying refuge merely because many people are persecuted); Robert
Kozak, Canada's Homosexual Refugee Ruling Has Wider Implications, REUTERS, Jan. 14, 1992
(reporting that analysts do not think Re: Inaudi will lead to large influx of refugees
claiming persecution due to sexual orientation because it is difficult to prove); Neal,
supra note 330 (arguing that class size is not proper judicial concern in asylum cases).
But see Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit,
in Sanchez, expressed its disapproval of an over-broad interpretation of a "particular
social group" that would include individuals with "a plethora of different lifestyles, vary-
ing interests, diverse cultures and contrary political leanings." Id. at 1577. The court in
Sanchez offered a family as a prototypical example of a particular social group. Id. Tul-
ler, supra note 5 (stating that holding that homosexuals constitute particular social
group could be harbinger of thousands of similar cases).
371. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1988) (providing full definition of refugee);
supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (setting forth requirements for being consid-
ered refugee).
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